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TURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Recipients/Appellants have intentionally limited the scope of this
Brief to the issues that they believe this Court intended to hear, based on the
Court's May 30, 2007 Order.1 The Order granted this interlocutory appeal and
stated two issues:
1. Whether this Court has jurisdiction, pursuant to rule 5 of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure, to review the December 22, 2006
"order on motion for decertification", in light of the district court's
subsequent minute entry, dated January 12, 2007, designating the
December 22 order "provisional", and its February 15, 2007 order
designating the December 22 order as "final" without making any
modifications to it.
2. If so, whether the district court's December 22, 2006 decision and
order decertifying the class was erroneous.
R. 4318-4321, Supreme Court's Order of May 30,2007, Addendum 5. Recipients
accept statement two as a limitation of scope and a denial by the Court of the

Initially, Recipients requested that this Court "entertain in this
interlocutory appeal [nine] other interlocutory orders where the resolution of these
matters will have a 'meaningful effect' on the parties and result in a more speedy
and certain resolution of this litigation which is now in its 13th year." Plaintiffs'
Petition for Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order, March 7, 2007 (not
included in the official Record).
-VI-

request to entertain the other motions noted in the Petition, and will limit their
response unless notified by the Court to the contrary.
The appropriate standard of appellate review is "correctness," since
both issues are questions of law (legal interpretation of a rule of appellate
procedure and a case holding). This Court gives no deference to trial court rulings
interpreting statutes and cases. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811
P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991).
Related Questions. Recipients believe that there are two additional
legal issues that track exactly with the scope of this appeal as set forth in the
5/30/07 Order. These additional issues are:
1.

What are the appropriate class criteria, given the ruling in

Houghton III?
2.

Should the Plaintiffs have full discovery on remand?

In a nutshell, we believe this Court has already determined the answrer to the first
question in Houghton HI, and need only restate it on remand as the qualifying class
criteria. This would greatly assist the fair and speedy resolution of this case.
As to discovery, the limited discovery allowed below has severely
hampered and obstructed the resolution of this matter. This Court has twice
previously instructed the trial court to grant full discovery, but the trial court did
not follow that admonition. On remand, there should be an unmistakable order

-vii-

granting/*/// iliscovay so that all pertinent matters may be presented for resolution.
This will also greatly speed the case along.
If we have overstepped our bounds in asking for consideration of
these two closely related matters, we apologize in advance. The arguments thereon
will be very brief, and we believe the Court will agree that they should be
considered as part of this interlocutory appeal.
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Two sections of the Medical Benefits Recovery Act ("Act") are
controlling, at least in part (with the relevant language highlighted):
A. Recovery of Lien by the State [1998]
26-19-5. Recovery of medical assistance from third party - Lien — Notice «
Action - Compromise or waiver — Recipient's right to action protected.
[1998]
(1) (a) When the department provides or becomes obligated to provide medical
assistance to a recipient because of an injury, disease, or disability that a third
party is obligated to pay for, the department may recover the medical assistance
directly from that third party.
(b) The department's claim to recover medical assistance provided as a result of the
injury, disease, or disability is a lien against any proceeds payable to or on behalf
of the recipient by that third party. This lien has priority over all other claims to
the proceeds, except claims for attorney fees and costs authorized under Subsection
26-19-7(4).
(2) The department shall mail or deliver written notice of its lien to the third party
at its principal place of business or last known address. The notice shall include a
recipient name, the approximate date of injury, a general description of the type
of injury and, if applicable, the general location where the injury is alleged to have
occurred.
-viii-

(3) The department may commence an action on its lien in its own name, but that
lien is not enforceable as to a third party unless:
(a) the third party receives written notice of the department's lien
before it settles with the recipient; or
(b) the department has evidence that the third party had knowledge
that the department provided or was obligated to provide medical
assistance.
(4) The department may waive a claim against a third party in whole or in part, or
may compromise, settle, or release a claim or lien.
(5) An action commenced under this section does not bar an action by a recipient
or a dependent of a recipient for loss or damage not included in the department's
action.
(6) The department's lien on proceeds under this section is not affected by the
transfer of the proceeds to a trust, account, or other financial instrument.
(Emphasis added.)
B. Recovery by Recipient - Attorney's Fees
26-19-7. Action or claim by recipient - Consent of department required Department's right to intervene - Department's interests protected Attorney's fees and costs. [1995]
(1) (a) A recipient may not file a claim, commence an action, or settle,
compromise, release, or waive a claim against a third party for recovery of medical
costs for an injury, disease, or disability for which the department has provided or
has become obligated to provide medical assistance, without the department's
written consent.
(b) The department has an unconditional right to intervene in an action
commenced by a recipient for recovery of medical costs connected with the same
injury, disease, or disability, for which it has provided or has become obligated to
provide medical assistance.

-ix-

(2) (a) If the recipient proceeds without the department's written consent as
required by Subsection (l)(a), the department is not bound by any decision,
judgment, agreement, or compromise rendered or made on the claim or in the
action.
(b) The department may recover in full from the recipient or any party to which
the proceeds were made payable all medical assistance which it has provided and
retains its right to commence an independent action against the third party, subject
to Subsection 26-19-5(3).
(3) The department's written consent, if given, shall state under what terms the
interests of the department may be represented in an action commenced by the
recipient.
(4) The department may not pay more than 33% of its total recovery for attorney
fees, but shall pay a proportionate share of the costs in an action that is commenced
with the departments written consent.
(Emphasis added.)
CONTROLLING CASE LAW
1. Houghton v. Dept. of Health, 2005 UT 63, 125 P.3d 860 {"Houghton III").
2. State v. McCoy, 2000 UT 39, 999 P.2d 572 ("McCoy").

-x-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Certification on Attorney Fees Issue. This action was filed on
October 27, 1995, and Class II plaintiffs (recipients with attorneys) were certified
as a class by stipulation on January 29, 1996. R. 1, 98 and 100. In Houghton HI,
the State challenged the certification on the grounds that the attorney fees claim
was insufficiently noticed. This Court rejected that claim noting "[w]e therefore
conclude that plaintiffs' notice of claim was sufficient to communicate the nature
of the [attorney fees] claim they now assert." Houghton v. DepL of Health, 2005 UT
63, 125 P.3d 860, If 23 (llHoughton III") (parenthetical added).
Three Prior Appeals.

In the first appeal, this Court reversed

disqualification of Plaintiffs' counsel. Houghton v. Dept. of Health, 962 P.2d 58
(Utah 1998). In the second appeal, this Court unanimously reversed the trial
court's dismissal of the Class II Plaintiffs' attorney fee claims. See Houghton v.
Department of Health, 2002 UT 101, 57 P.3d 1067, MI 10, 11 (uHoughton IF). On
the third appeal, this Court unanimously held that the trial court misinterpreted
both the statute and this Court's ruling in State v. McCoy, 2000 UT 39, 999 P.2d
572.

The State's obligation to pay a proportionate attorney's fee was not

dependent on "whether the recipient expressly excluded the State's claim," but on
whether consent had been requested. "In all cases" where consent was requested,
the State owed "its proportionate share of attorney's fees." Houghton III, 111148,49.
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The Court also reversed the trial court's failure to grant discovery and criticized its
unduly narrow interpretation of McCoy. Sec Houghton III, 1111 49-5 1.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts are relevant to the consideration of this
interlocutory appeal:
Limited Discovery and Early Focus on Decertification
1.

Decertification Was the Focus on Remand. The Utah

Supreme Court ordered full discovery on remand. Houghton HI, UU 38. However,
in the very first hearing after remand the trial court noted "on the basis of the
record before me, [I see] no common issue that would justify the case continuing as
a class action". R. 4337 (Transcript of 1/13/06 Hearing, emphasis added). With
that encouragement, Defendants filed another motion to decertify on February 17,
2006. R. 2087. Class decertification was confirmed as a "final order" on February
15, 2007, 11 years after the class was first certified. R. 4291.
2.

Fourth Appeal. This fourth appeal deals with the trial court's

failure to follow the Houghton III ruling defining class criteria which specifically
recognized that Medicaid recipients are entitled to have the State pay a
"proportionate share" of the recipient's attorney fees for recovering the State's lien,
with consent. Houghton III, Hlf 39, 49. Other related motions important to the
class were also denied. R. 4291.
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3.

Limited Discovery in Eleventh Year of Litigation. Due to

persistent resistance by the State, no discovery was had until 2006. R. 106, 608
and 802. Judge Quinn's 2003 ruling limiting the scope of discovery was appealed
and this Court held that the "district court adopted an erroneously narrow view of
our holding in McCoy " Houghton III, H 50. This Court reversed and remanded
with "instructions to modify the scope of the discovery order consistent with this
opinion." Id. The trial court ignored this instruction and allowed only narrow
discovery focused on whether the class should be decertified.

Fact 1 above;

R. 4337; R. 2047, Order Re: Production of Documents, Confidentiality, and
Briefing of Class Certification of Issues.
Failure to Follow Houghton III
4.

Trial Court Adopts Wholly New Standard. The trial court's

recent Order of 12/22/06 inexplicably ignores Houghton Ill's requirement that the
State is required to "pay a proportionate share of the plaintiffs attorney fees," and
instead adopts a wholly new "reasonable fee" standard determined by the "totality
of the circumstances."

Compare Houghton 111, MI 39, 49 with the 12/22/06

Provisional Decertification Order, pps. 27, 20. R. 1895, 4194.
5.

New Standard is Basis of Decertification. Because what is

"reasonable" varies under the "totality of the circumstances," the trial court
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reasoned that numerous individual issues predominate, justifying decertification
due to lack of "predominance." 12/22/06 Provisional Order, pps. 29, 38, 42-44.
6.

Trial Court Criticizes Supreme Court.

The trial court

franldy criticized the Supreme Court's Opinion in Houghton HI as "not completely
consistent" and "unexplained," among other criticisms.

12/22/06 Provisional

Order, pps. 28-9, R. 4194.
Discovery and Spoliation of Evidence
7.

About 2,786 Potential Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs deposed Brent

Perry, Director of the Bureau of Medical Collections of ORS, who stated that the
State's "database" could be queried as to third-party liability ("TPL") cases.
R. 3527, Brent Perry Depo., p. 116:7-11.

The query produced an 80-page

document with 2,786 entries. See R. 3529-3610. This document purports to list
all TPL recoveries in tort cases resulting in lien reimbursement where the recipient
apparently had an attorney.2 There are other codes on the document, and other
information may be able to be produced. Since discovery was limited, it is unclear
whether this includes all potential class members.

2

The first page of R. 3529 states that this is "Defendants' Fourth
Production of Documents" and that the query includes "personal injury case files
from November 1, 1994, to present." It then provides information "that includes
attorney involvement, ORS reimbursement, case name, case number, open/close
dates and whether a collection agreement was sent." See R. 3529.
-4-

8.

Preliminary Data on 412 Cases Examined. Analysis of the

data from the computer narratives of the 412 "cases," and the smattering of hard
files that remain, shows:
412 421 286 -

254 27 19
1
2
1
58
I
3
93
II
38

-

Files examined
Actual number of claims filed in the 412 cases
Cases where: 1) lien reimbursement amount, 2) consent
received or requested and 3) amount of attorney fee
payment can aU be determined (67%*)
Consent Requested (i.e., it can be determined) (89%T)
3 3 % (or proportionate) fee allowed (consent agreement
present) (11% of 254 cases*)
30% fee allowed (consent agreement present) (8%*)
2 8 % fee allowed (consent agreement present) (< 1%*)
27% fee allowed (consent agreement present) (<1%")
26% fee allowed (consent agreement present) (< 1%*)
2 5 % fee allowed (consent agreement present) (23%*)
24% fee allowed (consent agreement present) (<1% ? )
2 1 % fee allowed (consent agreement present) (1%*)
20% fee allowed (consent agreement present) (37%?)
1%-19% fee allowed (consent agreement present) (4%?)
No fee paid (consent requested or agreement present)
(15%*)3

R. 4165.
9.

Significance of Discovery Thus Far. It is clear from the

information provided that, due to spoliation and inadequate discovery, only 286
of the 421 claims (67%) had information sufficient to determine class criteria.
Assuming the same percentages hold for all 2,786 cases as exist for the 42leases,
3 3 % of those or 919 cases lack sufficient information to determine McCoy/Houghton

Legend:* Percentage of 4 2 1 , f Percentage of 286, * Percentage of 254.
-5-

777 class criteria.4 Therefore, if the ubiquitous 33% attorneys fee were present in
essentially all of the projected 2,786 cases, about 2,500 (89%) recipients who
secured lien reimbursement for the State were paid less than a proportionate fee.
This group constitutes the putative class.
10.

Spoliation of Evidence is Admitted. Massive spoliation

occurred in this case in that virtually all the hard case files prior to 2001 were
destroyed, during the litigation. The computer narratives that remain are often
woefully incomplete. O.R.S. boss Brent Perry testified regarding this destruction:
Q. All right. And do you know if paper files have been
destroyed during that time, despite the fact that there's litigation
going?
A. I can tell you that we have files [back] to 2001. Prior to
that the paper files were destroyed.
Q. Even despite the fact that there was litigation?
A. I guess, yes.
R. 3520-3521, Perry Depo. 60:7-61:3 (emphasis, double emphasis and
parenthetical added). Thus, despite awareness of the Houghton litigation, files were
destroyed yearly, resulting in the loss of about 7-9 crucial years. The 1991-2000

4

Of the 286 claims reviewed, 254 had specific requests for consent as well
as information regarding the percentage fee paid. Of those 254, an attorney fee of
less than 33% was paid in about 89% of the total cases. This means about 2,480
recipients of the 2,786 potential class members were most likely paid less than the
required proportional fee. In approximately 15% of the cases, no fee was paid even
though there was a consent agreement. In about74% of the cases, the fee paid was
30% or less. See Fact 8 above.
-6-

files represent the critical pre-McCoy years before there was a policy change in
about 2001, and a statute change in 2005. Sec Fact 24.
11.

Fruit of Spoliation: Difficulty in Determining Consent.

Due to spoliation, it is nearly impossible to determine from the remaining records
whether consent was given, whether it was requested and denied, and the reasons
for the alleged denial. This is verified by the State's own description of cases in its
Decertification Memorandum II, 9/1/06, pps. 7-10, R. 2813-2816.5 Mr. Perry
testified it would be very difficult to determine whether a lien was reduced in order
to pay attorney fees.

R. 3527, Perry Depo. 114:19-115:8. This prejudices

approximately one-third to 40% of the total cases, since much information cannot
be determined from computer narratives alone. See samples, R. 3612-3632.
Payment, Accounting and Value of Claims.
12.

No Attorney Fee Paid on Cases Under $1,000. The States

policy was to pay no attorney fees if the recovery was under $ 1,000. See R. 3631

5

These State-cited cases (R. 2813-2816) contain a description of "28 case
files" where the State admits that "the recipient's request for consent was denied"
and there was no contribution made for the recipient's attorney fees. Id. at p. 7.
Of the 28 cases listed on these pages, 12 of them note that it is "unclearfrom the
notes why consent was denied." Id. (Items 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 13, 14, 16, 18, 23 and
24) (emphasis added). In another 13 cases, the phrase "consent was apparently
denied" appears 13 times. Id. (Items 1,3,7,9, 10, 12, 15, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22 and
25) (emphasis added). Thus, due to lack of information in the "narratives," it is
either "unclear" or questionable about why consent was denied in 25 of 28 cases
cited by the defense. We cannot go back to the hard case files to investigate
because they have been destroyed.
-7-

("It is our ORS policy to offer a collection agreement to the attorneys when the
Medicaid lien goes over $1,000"). There are approximately 1,300 such cases
valued at somewhere in the neighborhood of $430,000.
13.

No Consent Offered on IHC/Other Collection Cases. The

State had a policy for some time of not offering consent on any cases where it had
an agreement with IHC or other HMOs to collect medical expenses for the HMO.
See R. 3811-3849, Case Nos. C000265067 and C000269953.
14.

No Attorney Fees Paid.

The number of cases where an

attorney fee was not paid appears to number approximately 100 cases during the
period 1994-2001. See examples in R. 3633-3642, Case No. C000156273, p. 3;
and Case No. C000156239, p. 5.
15.

Approximate Dollar Value of Class Claims. The States

summary purportedly shows TPL collections from approximately 1994 to 2006.
R. 3529-3610. During this 12-year period, the State collected approximately
$18,000,000 in Medicaid reimbursement from recipients who brought third party
claims. Based on our preliminary evaluation without full discovery, the State paid
an average of 22% for attorney fees (Fact 8 above) when it was required to pay a
proportionate amount, usually 33%. Accordingly, Plaintiffs estimate that a 33%
attorney fee, or $6,000,000, was owed, and that the State paid only about 2/3 of
that, or $4,000,000, and that $2,000,000 is still owing.
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16.

Recipients Typically Pay at Least a One-Third Attorney

Fee on TPL Claims. In virtually all cases, the typical Medicaid recipient with a
TPL claim pays his or her attorney a minimum contingent fee of one-third on the
givss recovay (and many pay 40% on difficult cases).6 See R. 3778-3782, Affidavit
of Colin King, Esq., and R. 3784-3788, Affidavit of Steven Sullivan, Esq.
Interlocutory Appeal Was Timely
17.

January 12 th Minute Entry Not "Advisory" Due to 3 Days

for Mailing. The trial court's provisional "Order on Motion for Decertification"
was filed by the court on Friday, December 22, 2006, and was mailed on the same
day. R. 4194. Ignoring for a moment the trial court's own designation of the
12/22/06 Order as "provisional," the time for filing an interlocutory appeal of the
December 22nd Order would be twenty days, plus three days mailing under Rule
22(d), Utah R. App. P.7 Under a correct computation, the deadline was Tuesday,

6

As a matter of course, with a rare exception for special circumstances, the
recipient always pays his/her attorney the percentage fee agreed on \ht gross amount
of the recovery, and not on the net. Recipients typically pay all liens, including
medicaid liens, out of their share of the recovery. Costs and liens are seldom
deducted from the gross recovery before the attorney fee is determined. R. 377882, 3784-88.
7

Twenty days from the December 22nd order would be January 11th. With
the additional three days for mailing, the deadline falls on Sunday, January 14th.
The 15th was a federal holiday. Thus the actual deadline is Tuesday, January 16th.
This computation of time arrives at the same result whether the 3 mailing days are
calculated at the beginning or end of the 20 day period.
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January 16, 2007, meaning the court's Januaiy 12, 2007 Minute Entry designating
the December 22nd Order as "not final ... provisional" could not be "advisorv"
under the State's theory. R. 4254.
18.

Supplemental Briefs Related to Decertification. The

12/22/06 Provisional Decertification Order observes that the decision "to decertify
the class potentially impacts at least some of the various pending motions from the
parties." For that reason, the court ordered the parties to "submit supplemental
briefs by January 12, 2007 addressing any impact of today's ruling on the various
outstanding motions." Then,
Once the parties have filed the supplemental briefs, this Court wall
schedule a hearing to hear arguments on all remaining outstanding
motions.
R. 4194-4248, p. 54 (emphasis added).
19.

January 9,2007 Inquiry by Counsel. Because the trial court

solicited additional briefs for filing after the interlocutory appeal cut-off date,
Plaintiffs7 counsel faxed Judge Quinn the 1/9/07 letter. R. 4249. Counsel therein
pointed out possible problems because the briefs were due after "the time for
appealing the decertification [order] will have undoubtedly passed." R. 4249.8

8

Counsel suggested that the court make it clear that Order was not "not a
final Order until such time as you have ruled on these other matters." R. 4249.
The letter then concluded with the statement that "It is an unusual situation and
I am not quite sure exactly how to proceed, but I do need to protect the right to
appeal, as you can well imagine." R. 4250 (emphasis added).
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20.

December 22 nd Order Clarified as "Provisional." Judge

Quinn's 1/12/07 responsive Minute Entry clarified that "the Court's Order of
December 22, 2006 is not intended as a final order," but "should he considered
provisional" until the additional motions were heard on January 23, 2007.
R. 4254 (emphasis added).
21.

The Trial Court Adopts 12/22/06 Order Anew in 01/23/07

Hearing. The additional motions were heard in oral argument on January 23,
2007. R. 4273. The court then adopted the 12/22/06 Provisional Order anew, as
this colloquy reveals:
MR. SYKES: Are you going to then issue just a revision of
your prior order [of 12/22/06] incorporating everything?
THE COURT: Let's have Mr. Lott prepare the order on
today's [1/23/07] hearing denying those motions on the basis that
I've stated and stating that the Court adopts the order dated 12/22
as its order for the issues addressed therein.
Official Transcript 01/23/07 Hearing, p. 62:8-14,20-24, R. 4337 (emphasis and
parenthetical added).
22.

Interlocutory Appeal Anticipated by All. The court and all

counsel anticipated the interlocutory appeal from the reincorporated 12/22/06
Provisional Order, and discussed this at the 01/23/07 hearing.

R. 4437-8

(Transcript, p. 63:1-7). The Court requested that Plaintiffs' counsel file a motion
for a stay "once you know whether or not the Supreme Court has accepted your
interlocutory appeal." R.4337 (Transcript of 1/23/07 hearing, pps. 63-4).
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23.

Revised Order of 02/15/07 Makes 12/22/06 Order Final.

The trial court issued its revised Order on February 15, 2007. R. 4291-4295,
Addendum 4 herein. That 2/15/07 Order reflects, inter alia, under a subtitle
"Impact of December 22, 2006 Order," that the court's Order of that date
"necessarily impacts Plaintiffs' remaining motions as addressed herein."

It

proceeds to discuss those motions and the court's ruling thereon. The Order then
contains a bold heading which states "The December 22, 2006 Order on Motion
for Decertification Is Now a Final Order." The Order finally recites:
The Court's January 12, 2007 Minute Entry provided that the
December 22, 2006 Order was not intended to be a final order until
after consideration of the additional motions addressed herein. ...
There will be no modifications to the December 22, 2006 Order on
Motion for Decertification. ... With the signing of this Order, the
December 22, 2006 Order is now a final order.
R. 4291-4295, p. 3 (emphasis and double emphasis added). Accordingly, "the
December 22, 2006 Order on Motion for Decertification" was unow a final order"
on 2/15/07.
Legislature Adopted "Proportionate" Standard
24.

Legislative Change Adopts 33.3% Fee. During almost all of

this litigation, until the year 2005, the statute in effect was exactly as quoted
herein. Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(4). In 2005, the Legislature amended the
statute to confirm the State's obligation to pay an attorney's fee of 33.3% "of the
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department's total recovery," as well as "a proportionate share of the litigation
expenses directly related to the action."Utah Code Ann. §26-19-7(2) (c)(ii) (2005).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A.
Recipients' petition for interlocutory appeal was timely filed because
the trial court designated the December 22, 2006 decertification order as
"provisional" and "not final" until the January 23, 2007 hearing. The order arising
from the January 23, 2007 hearing was signed on February 15, 2007, and a timely
petition for interlocutory appeal was filed on March 7, 2007.
B.
The class decertification order was erroneous because it failed to apply
this Court's Houghton HI standard requiring the State to pay a proportionate share
of attorney fees as long as the recipient or his attorney requested consent.
C.
This Court should rule unequivocally that the class-qualifying criteria,
based on the language in Houghton III, are 1) a state lien reimbursement, 2)
obtained by recipient's attorney, and 3) with state consent or request for consent.
D.
This Court should order full discovery. Full discovery would assist
in moving the case forward to rapid resolution because relevant information
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necessary to determining class membership has been extremely difficult or
impossible to get, given the limited discovery allowed by the trial court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
~ Interlocutory Appeal Was Timely Filed ~
PLAINTIFFS' PETITION FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL
WAS TIMELY FILED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT
DESIGNATED THE DECEMBER 22, 2006 DECERTIFICATION ORDER AS "PROVISIONAL" AND "NOT FINAL"
UNTIL THE JANUARY 23, 2007 HEARING. THE ORDER
ARISING FROM THE JANUARY 23, 2007 HEARING WAS
SIGNED ONFEBRUARY15,2007, AND A TIMELY PETITION
FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL WAS FILED ON MARCH 7,
2007.
The State argues in its Opposition to the Interlocutory Appeal
Petition that Plaintiffs' Petition was not timely filed, depriving the Supreme Court
of jurisdiction to hear this matter. See State's Answer in Opposition, 04/12/07.9
The State's main argument is that the 1/12/07 Minute Entry must be considered
an "advisory opinion" because it was entered one day after January 11 th , alleged by
the State to be the 20 th day after 12/22/06. This reflects simple miscalculation by
the State, as its arguments ignore some of the rules for computing deadlines.

9

We are generally employing numeric dates because they seem to aid in
clarity when so many dates are discussed in a short space.
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A.

A Trial Court May Revise Its Orders at Any Time.

Rule 54(b), Utah R. Civ. P. provides that "any order or other form of
decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the
rights . . . is subject to revision at any time before the entry ofjudgment adjudicating
all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties." Here, the 12/22/06
Provisional Order adjudicated "fewer than all the claims" for "fewer than all the
parties," and there had never been an entry of an order complying with the first
sentence in Rule 54(b), i.e., directing final judgment, until the 2/15/07 Final Order.
By the 12/22/06 Provisional Order's original language, not "all the claims" of the
parties were decided, so the court solicited "supplemental briefs." See Fact 18.
The trial court clearly recognized that other pending motions would
be affected, and therefore invited "the supplemental briefs" on those issues.
Fact 18. "The December 22nd Order should be considered provisional" until such
time as additional motions were heard on 1/23/07. Facts 17, 20; R. 4254. It was
well within the trial court's Rule 54(b) prerogative to allow this "revision," and it
means that the first day for appeal of the interlocutory order arose on 2/15/07, and
the 20 th day would be March 7, 2007. With three days for mailing, the deadline
to file the interlocutory appeal on this case would be March 10, 2007. The
Petition herein was filed March 7, 2007, making it timely under either scenario.
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B.

Not Significant That the Trial Court Allegedly Made No
Changes to the "Provisional" 12/22/06 Order.

The Supreme Court's Order granting the interlocutory appeal poses
the jurisdictional question of whether it has the right to review the 12/22/06
Provisional Order "in light of the district court's subsequent minute entry, dated
January 12, 2007, designating the December 22 order 'provisional', and its
February 15, 2007 order designating the December 22 order as 'final' without
making any modifications to it." See Supreme Court Order, 05/30/07, R. 4318.
Appellants argue that the 2/15/07 Order did modify the 12/22/06 Provisional Order
by stating "the December 22, 2006 Order on Motion for Decertification is now a
Final Order." Fact 23, R. 4291, p. 3 (emphasis added). Prior to that, the
12/22/06 Order was simply "provisional," so "[w]ith the signing of this [2/15/07]
Order, the December 22, 2006 Order is now a final Order." Id. (parenthetical
added). Then "provisional," now "final": that is a modification.
Even if the 12/22/06 Order was not "modified" in some technical
sense, that should not make any difference here. The trial court, in a timely
manner, designated the 12/22/06 Order as "provisional" until the hearing of other
motions. Plaintiffs' counsel reasonably relied upon that statement by the court as
postponing the time to appeal. Equity requires that the "provisional" designation
be respected.
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C.

No "Advisory Opinion."10

The 1/12/07 Minute Entry cannot be considered "an advisory
opinion." The State miscalculated the time under Rule 22(d), Utah R. App. P. See
Fact 17.
D.

Intent That 12/22/06 Order Was "Provisional."

The trial court itself said that "the December 22nd Order should be
considered provisional" until the other motions were heard and decided on
1/23/07. R. 4249, 4254. The colloquy at the 1/23/07 hearing clarified the intent
to preserve the interlocutory appeal right. Fact 21. Accordingly, the trial court
agreed that the December 22nd Order was "provisional" and "not... final" until the
other related matters could be briefed and heard on January 23 rd . Fact 17.
Plaintiffs relied in good faith on the trial court's and defense counsel's
assurance that the December 22nd Order was "provisional" and "not ... final" for
purposes of their interlocutory appeal. It would be grossly unfair to now hold that
this interlocutory appeal was somehow untimely filed, when counsel in good faith
relied on defense counsel, who prepared the order, and the trial court to clarify the

10

This "Advisory Opinion" argument by the State is irrelevant if a trial
court has its own interlocutory authority to change its rulings under Rule 54(b).
Nevertheless, because the issue has been raised by the Defense, a response is made
herein to that argument.
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intent to preserve the interlocutory appeal right. The State should be equitably
and judicially estopped from making a contrary argument.
The 1/23/07 hearing resulted in an Order being entered on 2/15/07.
R. 4291. A timely interlocutory appeal was taken from that final, interlocutory
order, which incorporated the December 22nd Order. See Plaintiffs' Petition,
3/07/07.
E.

Interlocutory Appeal Should be Granted Now Based on
Principles of Equity and Tudicial Economy.

The Decertification Order guts the Plaintiffs' class action, which is the
main issue. To proceed to trial at the district court level on the claims of the four
named Plaintiffs would be pointless. These four individual cases would be judged
on the basis of an erroneous legal standard, i.e. "totality of the circumstances."
There is absolutely nothing to be gained by that, and it would simply cause more
delay in a very old case. All of the truly important issues in the larger case lie with
the class, not the named class representatives.
This case has now been appealed four times to the Utah Supreme
Court. It surely is one of the oldest cases on the Court's docket. In order to be fair
to the parties, and in an effort to get this case finally resolved, it is equitable and
sensible to allow this matter to be appealed, especially in light of the fact that
Plaintiffs' counsel did everything possible to preserve the right to appeal.
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What more could anyone expect of Plaintiffs, when the trial court
solicited "supplemental briefs" in the final paragraph of the 12/22/06 Provisional
Order? Fact 18. Seeking clarification from the court by the 1/9/07 letter (Fact 19)
was reasonable and appropriate. Should Plaintiffs have insulted the trial court and
said "no, we don't believe you and cannot rely on your orders and therefore we are
going to appeal anyway"? Parties should not have to practice law in such an
extreme and outrageous way in order to protect the timing of a right to appeal.
Counsel should be able in good faith to rely on defense counsel's good faith in
preparing the Order (R. 4291), as well as the trial court's designation of the
12/22/06 Order as "provisional." It is fair that this Court hear this Interlocutory
Appeal now.
Therefore, based on the principles of equity and judicial economy,
this Court should allow the interlocutory appeal to go forward and hear the issue
regarding the decertification of the class at this time.
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POINT II
~ Decertification Was Erroneous Under Houghton HI Standard —
THE CLASS DECERTIFICATION ORDER WAS ERRONEOUS
BECAUSE IT FAILED TO APPLY THIS COURTS
HOUGHTON III STANDARD REQUIRING THE STATE TO
PAY "ITS PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF ATTORNEY FEES IF
THE RECIPIENT OR HIS ATTORNEY REQUESTED
CONSENT FROM THE STATE."
A.

Summary of Problems with Decertification Order.

Several problems are immediately apparent with the trial court's
interpretation. First, the trial court seemingly ignores Houghton Ill's definitive
bright-line interpretation of McCoy that the State must pay "its proportionate share
of attorney fees if the recipient or his attorney requested consent from the State."
Houghton IIIf H 49. It continually refers to a uMcCoy cause of action," even though
Houghton HI substantially explains and interprets McCoy. McCoy, in the year 2000,
dealt with the attorney fees issue fairly briefly, in about 7 paragraphs. McCoy Ml
13-19. In contrast, 21 paragraphs in Houghton III address attorney fees in great
detail. Houghton HI 1111 31-51. How then could the trial court simply ignore
Houghton IIVs definitive interpretation of McCoy as requiring a proportionate fee?
Second, the trial court fixates on the Supreme Court's "failure" to use
the word "proportionate" in McCoy, but ignores repeated use of the word in
Houghton III. R. 35, 39, 49. This is despite the fact that Houghton III is five years
more recent and "the law of the case."
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Third, the "totality of the circumstances standard" finds no support
in McCoy or Houghton III. "Totality of circumstances" is a rather vague, indefinite
standard. It is hard to fathom how such vagueness could devolve from Houghton
Ill's definitive language that "in all cases where the State satisfies its lien from
proceeds procured through the efforts of a private attorney, the State is responsible
for its proportionate share of attorney fees," if consent was requested. Houghton III,
11 49 (emphasis added). There is an apparent disconnect.
Fourth, the trial court is simply dead wrong when it says that there is
"nothing in § 26-19-7 that requires the State to pay the same percentage of
attorney fees to the recipient as the recipient is paying to his attorney." See cited
portion in Point 11. A. above; R. 4194, p. 21. The trial court criticizes Plaintiffs7
repeated "attempt to connect the 'proportionate costs' section of § 26-19-7(4) to
the attorney fees section, but the Utah Supreme Court rejected that approach in
McCoy. 2000 UT at 11 16." See Provisional Order, R. 4194, p. 20, fn 10. To the
contrary, however, this "approach" is exactly what the Supreme Court endorsed in
Houghton III Houghton III U 33-35, 39.
These points are elaborated below.
B.

Trial Court Rejects and Criticizes Houghton III.

The trial court roundly rejected the Supreme Court's holding that the
State is liable for its proportionate share of attorney fees on the procurement of
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State lien reimbursement with consent. Instead, the trial court created its own
standard of a "reasonable fee" being determined by the "totality of the
circumstances," which is not found in either McCoy or Houghton HI. The trial court
held:
In other words, the standard for determining reasonable fees is a
totality of the circumstances standard.
[T]here is nothing in the [Houghton III] court's use of the term
"proportionate" to suggest that they [sic] are rejecting its use of the
term "reasonable" in McCoy or that they [sic] intend "proportionate"
to mean the same attorney fees as paid by the recipient to his
attorney.
12/22/06 Provisional Order, p. 22, 27 (emphasis and parenthetical added), R.
4215, 4220. The trial court then substantially criticized this Court's Houghton HI
decision as "not completely consistent," as "never directly addressing] how
attorney fees" are to be calculated, and as "not [having] used uniform language"
when referencing attorney fees under McCoy. 12/22/06 Provisional Order, p. 28,
R. 4221. See also, Fact 6, above.
The comparison of the McCoy, Houghton HI and trial court holdings
is dramatic:
McCoy
(proportionate)
We therefore conclude that under subsection (4) [Utah Code Ann.
§ 26-19-7(4)], ... the State must pay the attorney fees incurred in
procuring the State's share of the settlement proceeds.
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McCoy, 11 18 (emphasis and parenthetical added).
Houghton HI
(proportionate, interpreting McCoy 1f 18 passage above)
[W]e return to the underpinnings of our decision in McCoy. In
McCoy, we concluded that the State was obligated to pay a
proportionate share of the plaintiff's attorneyfees because the plaintiff
complied with section 26-19-7 of the Medicaid lien statute. Id. 11 18.
Accordingly, in all cases where the State satisfies its lien from
proceeds procured through the efforts of a private attorney, the State
is responsible for its proportionate share of attorney fees if the
recipient or his attorney requested a consent from the State.
Houghton III 1111 39, 49 (emphasis added).
Decertification Order
(rejects proportionate)
For this reason, the Court will discuss the elements for a McCoy
cause of action and then decide whether the class should be revised
to conform to McCoy or should instead be decertified. ... The court
will now review the elements that must be met under McCoy in order
to recover attorney fees from the State.
In McCoy, the Utah Supreme Court never used the phrase
"proportionate" to describe the State's share of attorney fees. ...
[T]he McCoy court uses "reasonable."
There is nothing in § 26-19-7 that requires the State to pay the same
percentage of attorney fees to the recipient as the recipient is paying
to his attorney. ... In other words, the standard for determining
reasonable attorney fees is a totality of the circumstances standard.
[Tjhere is nothing in the [Utah Supreme] court's use of the term
"proportionate" to suggest that they [sic] are rejecting its use of the
term "reasonable" in McCoy or that they [sic] intend "proportionate"
to mean the same attorneyfees as paid by the recipient to his attorney.
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R. 4194, 12/22/06-2/15/07 Decertification Order, pps. 10, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 27
respectively (emphasis added). McCoy, W 13-19. The trial court order thus rejects
the proportional standard set forth in McCoy and Houghton HI in favor of the newly
created "totality of the circumstances" standard.
C.

McCoy's
" Incurred
Proportionate Fee

in

Procuring"

Mandates

a

McCoy specifically rejects the State's arbitrary "at its discretion"
argument with respect to attorney fees:
Moreover, the State provides no statutory, case law, or policy basis
for limiting awards of attorney fees to those recipients to whom the
State, at its discretion, grants consent. We see no justification for so
limiting the relatively broad reach of subsection (4) in the case before
us.
McCoy, 1f 18 (emphasis added). Instead, McCoy characterizes subsection 7(4) as
having a "relatively broad reach." McCoy then holds that "the State must pay the
attorney fees incurred in procuring the State's share of the settlement proceeds."
McCoy, H 18 (emphasis added). The language "[i]ncurred in procuring" can only
mean "proportionate." It means the same percentages incurred by the recipient in
paying his/her attorney to recover the damages. The words "must pay the attorney
fees" connote obligation as well as lack of discretion. What amount or percentage
"must [the State] pay?" The answer: whatever "attorney fees [the recipient]
incurred in procuring the State's share of the settlement proceeds." McCoy, H 18
(emphasis and parenthetical added). In other words, the "proportionate" attorney
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fee paid by the recipient to his/her own attorney (in almost all cases at least 33%)
on the recipient's share would be in the same proportion as "the attorney fees
incurred (by the recipient) in procuring the State's share."

McCoy, 11 18

(parenthetical added).
Ironically, the trial court's opinion concedes that the above-cited
McCoy, 11 18 "language is seemingly more consistent with the Plaintiffs' approach
than with the Court's approach." R. 4221, p. 28. The trial court then contends
that "no approach is going to be completely consistent with the Utah Supreme
Court's language because the language itself is not completely consistent." Id. The
court further criticizes the Utah Supreme Court as never having "directly addressed
how attorney fees under McCoy should be calculated," and "not [having] used
uniform language" when referencing an attorney fee award under McCoy. Id.
The decision then inexplicably makes the fundamental theoretical
error of trying to determine the appropriate attorney fee formula by reference to
McCoy alone, but ignores the contribution of Houghton HI. R. 4222 (plaintiffs'
approach is "inconsistent with the 'reasonable' language" in McCoy). The trial
court holds that a McCoy "reasonable" fee is the proper standard and "that
'reasonable attorney fees' under McCoy should be determined by examining the
totality of the circumstances under which the recipient procured the State's
recovery." R. 4222. The problem with using McCoy alone is that it was decided
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in the year 2000.

But Houghton III, in the year 2005, resolved any latent

ambiguities that might have existed in McCoy. Using McCoy without Houghton III
contributes to the trial court's fundamental misinterpretation.
D.

Houghton III "Obligates" Proportionate Attorney Fees.

Neither McCoy not Houghton HI set forth a "totality of the
circumstances" standard proposed by the trial court. Houghton III confirms McCoy's
interpretation of the statutory language and "obligates" payment of "a
proportionate share of . . . attorney fees":
We did, however, allow McCoy to recover a proportionate share of his
attorneyfees from the State, reasoning that McCoy had "followed the
requirements of the Act" by asking for the State's consent.
In McCoy, we concluded that the State was obligated to pay a
proportionate share of the plaintiffs attorneyfees because the plaintiff
complied with section 26-19- 7 of the Medicaid lien statute. We
based this conclusion on the fact that McCoy had requested consent
to pursue the State's claim.
Houghton III, 1111 35, 39 (citing McCoy, 11 18) (emphasis and double emphasis
added). After a lengthy 48-paragraph discussion of the history of the attorney fees
issue, the McCoy case and the Medicaid Reimbursement Statute, this Court held
unequivocally that the State was responsible for a "proportionate share of attorney
fees" in "all cases" where "the recipient or his attorney requested consent from the
State." See Houghton III, 11 49. The Houghton III Court then concludes, based on
McCoy:
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Under the general holding of McCoy, the State is obligated to pay its
share of a recipient's private attorney fees if either (1) the State
consents to the recipient's request to represent its interest; or (2) the
State satisfies its lien from proceeds procured through the efforts of
a recipient's private attorney in those cases where the recipient
requested, hut was denied, consent.
Houghton III, 11 51 (emphasis and double emphasis added). Thus, Houghton HI
unmistakably interprets both the statute and McCoy to "obligate" the State to pay
"a proportionate share of the plaintiffs attorney fees" where the State has
"consented to the representation," or the recipient "requested consent." Houghton
III, Hlf 38, 39, 40. The trial court's totality of the circumstances standard is
incompatible with "obligated to pay a proportionate share," as adopted by both
McCoy and Houghton IIL The use of the word "obligated" speaks volumes in
characterizing the State's legal responsibility to pay a "proportionate share" of
attorney fees.11
It is also obvious that Houghton HI is using "proportionate share of
attorney fees" and "fair share of attorney fees" synonymously, as it uses both terms
in the same context in Houghton III, 11 49. The trial court's vague "totality of the

11

A word search of the opinion reveals that a form of the word "obligated"
is used in this identical context 13 times, and "responsible for" is used once more
in that same context. Houghton III, Iflf 39, 40[2], 41 [3], 42, 43[2], 44, 48[2], and
51 ("obligated" or "obligation"), and 11 49 ("responsible").
The word
"proportionate" is specifically used three times in conjunction with "obligation" or
"responsibility" to pay fees. Houghton HI, Ml 39, 48 and 49. Houghton III further
uses the word or concept of an "obligation" of the State to pay its "fair share" of
attorney fees another three times. Houghton III, 1f1f 42, 44 and 49.
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circumstances" text is simply incompatible with the State's non-discretionary
"obligation" to pay a "proportionate share" of fees. This court should have no
problem finding these three 11 51 criteria (lien rccoveiy through the efforts of
recipient's attorney plus consent) to be the only essential requirements for class
certification.
Additionally, the trial courtY'totality of the circumstances" standard
dooms the class because a multitude of disparate circumstances and criteria
allegedly determine a "reasonable" attorney fee.

R. 4200-4222, 4233-4239.

According to the trial court, this would result in "numerous individual mini-trials
that would defeat the desired efficiency of having a class action case." R. 4239.
The "individual fact intensive inquiry ... makes certifying a class of Plaintiffs ...
inappropriate." Id. Accordingly, the trial court's rejection of Houghton III and
adoption of the erroneous "totality" standard leads directly to the decertification
due to lack of predominance, which destroys a key class requirement.
The restoration of the correct legal standard would in essence result
in a mandatory finding that the class was correctly certified. This is so because if
the State owes a proportionate share of attorney fees on its lien recovery in "all
cases" where consent is requested, the State will always pay whatever share the
recipient pays, which was clearly the intent in McCoy and Houghton III Thus, the
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fee is susceptible to calculation in a mathematical formula, which is appropriate for
class action resolution. See Section E below.
E.

Proper Construction
"Proportionate Share/'

of

the

Statute

Mandates

During almost all of this litigation, until the year 2005, the statute
in effect was exactly as quoted herein.12 It mandated "proportionate share":
(4) The department may not pay more than 33% of its total recovery
for attorney's fees, but shall pay a proportionate share of the costs in
an action that is commenced with the department's written consent.
Medical Benefits Recovery Act, Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(4) (1995), as cited in
McCoy, 11 16 and Houghton III, 11 33 (emphasis and double emphasis added). Read
in context with other provisions, the language of the statute requires the State to
pay proportionate attorney fees, even without reference to McCoy or Houghton III.
E.l.

Not lust Proportionate "Costs."

The trial court and defense counsel claim that the "proportionate"
language in the statute applies only to an attorney's out-of-pocket costs, but not
attorney fees.

R. 3861-3862; 4212-4213.

A few sentences of McCoy are

susceptible to that erroneous interpretation, if taken out of context. See McCoy,

12

In 2005, the Legislature amended the statute to confirm what essentially
was already the law, i.e., the payment of an attorney fee at 33.3% "of the
department's total recovery," as well as "a proportionate share of the litigation
expenses directly related to the action." Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(2)(c)(ii)
(2005). See Fact 24.
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H1f 16, 17. When those sentences are viewed in the context of the entire case,
especially McCoy 11 18 as explained in Houghton III 1111 35, 39, 5 1, those sentences
simply cannot be read as requiring anything but an assessment of a proportional fee.
First, McCoy, 11 18 says that it applies to "fees" ("must pay the
attorneyfees incurred in procuring the State's share"). Second, Houghton III, 1111 35,
39, 51 affirm that a "proportionate" fee is what McCoy, 11 18 means. Third, the
Houghton III "proportionate share" holding is clearly the "law of the case" for us.
Houghton III, 1111 49, 50, 51. Fourth, it is almost incomprehensible that the subject
statute would provide assessment of proportionate attorney "costs," while in the
very same sentence, require a "totality of the circumstances" standard for fee
assessment. This would mean that the Legislature, in a short, one sentence statute,
intended two different legal standards to apply, one standard for costs, but a
different one for fees. That is incomprehensible. Furthermore, why would the
Legislature be specifically concerned about out-of-pocket attorney "costs"?
Section 26-19-7(4) represents an acknowledgment that when a
recipient's attorney recovers the State's lien, there is always going to be a
proportionate attorney fee owed if consent was requested. The purpose of the
statute is obviously to protect that expectation interest, not to draw some artificial
distinction between fees and costs. Thus, it is clear that the Legislature used the
term "in an action" to refer to its antecedent in the statute, i.e., "recovery for

-30-

attorney fees." That is about exactly how one would expect a lay member of the
Legislature to view "attorney fees," i.e., as one of the "costs of litigation." In short,
the appropriate way to read the statute is that the State may not pay a fee "more
than 3 3 % , " but shall pay at least its proportionate share of the attorney fees, up
to 33%.
E.2.

Internal Structure.

The internal structure of the statute is pretty clearly intended to set
forth rules protecting both the State and the recipient in third party actions.
Generally, consent is required to represent the State's interest and the State is not
bound without that consent. Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-7(2)(a)(b). To that end,
the statute deals with the realities of who owes what, when the recipient's lawyer,
who probably has the case on a 1/3 contingent fee, recovers the State's lien
amount. It hardly seems accidental or happenstance that the statute uses virtually
the exact language of a "33% contingent fee."
It makes sense that Section 7 would address the benefits of securing
consent, along with the penalties of not having it. Subsection 7(4) does exactly
that. It assumes that consent has been requested and granted. See Subsections 7
(1), (2), and (3). Such a litigant is then rewarded for getting consent. The reward?
Under Subsection 7(4), the State "shall" pay a proportionate share of the attorney
fees recipient has already paid to the attorney in order to get the recovery for the
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State. In other words, the recipient gets a lien reduction in the same contingent
fee percentage he/she is paying his lawyer, not to exceed 33%, as a reward for
getting consent.
E.3.

Discretion Argument Not Logical in Context of Whole
Statute.

Rhetorically, does it make any sense that the Legislature would leave
the amount of the attorney fee to the whimsical discretion of a state agency, as
urged by the State and endorsed by the trial court? R. 4214-4215. The trial court
suggested there are many individual factors that go into determining a "reasonable
fee," and that the agency (ORS) is somehow equipped to make this determination.
R. 4235-4239.

Why would our Legislature ignore the ubiquitous one-third

attorney's fee in personal injury cases?
The Legislature would surely have considered the context of how the
issue will arise when it drafted Subsection 7(4) in 1995.
important.

That context is

After obtaining consent, the recipient, through his counsel, will

generally sue a third party tortfeasor. At some point, there is a settlement or a
judgment. Assume the recipient is paying his attorney a one-third contingent fee
on the gross recovery, as is customary. See Affidavits of Colin King and Steve
Sullivan, R. 3778-3782, 3784-3788. Thus, whatever segment of that recovery
represents the State's Medicaid lien should bear the same proportionate share of
the fee that the recipient has already paid to recipient's attorney. Any sensible
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citizen-legislator would see that as eminently fair. Not surprisingly, that's exactly
what the statute does by requiring the payment of "a proportionate share" of the
cost of an action, but "not... more than 3 3 % " of the total lien recovery for attorney
fees.
E.4.

Meaning of the Condition.

The sentence comprising Subsection 7(4) has a condition, but
uncharacteristically begins with the condition rather than having the condition at
the end of the sentence, as is more customary. For example, one may say "you may
go to the store, but you may not spend more than $ 100." Normally, however, the
limiting condition can be put at the front of the sentence without any loss of
meaning, such as "you may not spend more than $100 when you go to the store."
In the case of Subsection 7(4), the same is true, but putting the condition last makes
the sentence more clear, as follows:
The department shall pay a proportionate share of the litigation costs
of an action that is commenced with the department's written
consent, but shall not pay more than 3 3 % of its total lien recovery for
attorney fees.
In summary, the statute must be read in the context of what the
Legislature is trying to do. McCoy did exactly that in the year 2000, and Houghton
HI confirmed this interpretation. The statute rewards recipients who requested
consent with a proportionate fee reimbursement. Knowing that most attorneys
charge a one-third fee, it is clear from the statute itself that the legislature intended
-33-

to impose on the State a similar proportionate fee on lien reimbursement, not to
exceed 33%.
F.

McCoy-Houghton HI Formula Is Practical, Easy to Apply.

The McCoyIHoughton III formula works very well, is easy to use and
applies fairly in the everyday practice of personal injury law. It easily meets all
Rule 23 criteria.
Assuming the attorney fee to be 33% 13 on a $30,000 settlement with
a $10,000 Medicaid lien, the fee would be $9,900. Medicaid would be paid
$6,700 on its $10,000 lien. The other $3,300 would go directly to the recipient,
because the attorney has already been paid on the gross. Thus, the recipient would
receive $13,400, with the State's contribution of $3,300 to the recipient on the
$10,000 lien recovery. The attorney fee to the recipient stays the same, but
$3,300 of it now comes from the Medicaid lien reimbursement. The math is as
follows:
With Proportionate 33% Fee Reimbursement:
$30,000 Settlement
-$9,900 Attorney Fee (33%)
- $6,700 Medicaid Lien Reimbursement ($10,000 Lien minus
33% Fee Assessed Against Lien Amount)
$13,400 Net to Recipient

13

For purposes of simplicity and ease of calculation, the attorney fee on a
personal injury claim in this Brief is assumed to be 33%, although in reality most
are 33-1/3% or sometimes 40%.
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The recipient is hurt when the State pays less than its proportionate fee on its lien
reimbursement, as the following example illustrates:
With a 20%14 Medicaid Fee Reimbursement:
$30,000 Settlement
- $9,900 Attorney Fee (33%)
• $8.000 Medicaid Lien Reimbursement [$10,000 - 20% Fee]
$12,100 Net to Recipient
The 20% lien reimbursement shorts the recipient $1,300. Another common fee
reimbursement was 25%, which shorts the recipient $800.
The trial court believed the proportionate formula to be impractical,
claiming that it would result in non-uniformity of the formula for damages.
R. 4239. This represents a misunderstanding of personal injury law and the
proportionate formula. Does the proportionate formula still work with other fee
arrangements? Yes. Let us suppose for whatever reason, the attorney charged a
15% fee in the same example above. The deduction from the lien would be 15%
of the $10,000 lien, or $1,500. This is eminently simple and fair. Suppose the
attorney knows the recipient in a church context and agrees to charge a flat fee of
$2,000 on a $30,000 settlement with a $10,000 lien. The proportionate fee there
is simply $2,000/$30,000 or 6.66%, which means that the $10,000 Medicaid lien
would be reduced by only $666. Again, a proportionate fee formula is always a
14

State commonly paid a fee of 20 or 25% instead of a full proportionate
33%. Sometimes it paid less. See Facts 8, 9.
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simple mathematical calculation. There is no possible fee scenario does not lend
itself to easy and quick calculation for all members of the class, because the
formula works with any percentage fee, or even a flat fee.
POINT III
— Class Criteria Should Be Clearly Defined by the Court ~
THIS COURT SHOULD RULE UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT THE
CLASS CRITERIA ARE 1) A STATE LIEN REIMBURSEMENT,
2) OBTAINED BY RECIPIENT'S ATTORNEY, 3) WITH STATE
CONSENT OR REQUEST FOR CONSENT.
It would greatly advance the resolution of this case if this Court
would formally set forth the criteria necessary to qualify for class status. We are
not asking for anything novel, since the Court has already done this in Houghton HI
when it held:
Accordingly, in all cases where the State [1] satisfies its lien from
proceeds procured through the efforts of a [2] private attorney, the
State is responsible for its proportionate share of attorney fees if the
recipient or his attorney [3] requested consent from the State.
Houghton IIIf If 49 (parenthetical numbers and emphasis added). "All cases" means
all potential class members qualified under the following criteria:
a)

Lien reimbursement ("the State satisfies its lien");

b)

By a private attorney ("from proceeds procured through the
efforts of a private attorney"); and

c)

Consent ("if the recipient or his attorney requested consent
from the State").
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The parenthetical criteria are taken directly from the language of Houghton HI, 1149.
In short form, they represent the common criteria of lien reimbursement, through
a private attorney, with a consent request. Where those common criteria are
present, i.e., in "all cases," the State "is responsible for its proportionate share of
attorney fees." Houghton III, 11 49. This is a very sensible ruling since those three
criteria are all that matter. They are common to all potential class members.
Everything else is irrelevant to class certification and the ultimate litigation of the
issue.
This request should not be seen as seeking an advisory opinion
because a ruling on this matter would "have a meaningful effect on the parties."
Houghton HI, 1f 26 (internal quotes omitted). The resolution of the this matter once
and for all will define the parameters of this litigation as it moves forward. Each
party will understand exactly what needs to be proved to qualify for the class. It
will also eliminate discovery disputes because discovery can now focus on what is
important. Therefore, it is quite proper for the Supreme Court to rule on this
issue.
These common class criteria are not hypothetical, and they do have
"a bearing on the scope" of the decertification order. Id. at 11 28. The issue of the
common class criteria definitely needs to be addressed in the course of this
litigation because commonality is required. When this case is remanded to the trial
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court, these suggested class criteria will determine the scope of the class, the
qualification of individuals for class status, and the discovery on those potential
members.
Given the duration of this litigation, it seems prudent to have the
issue of the class criteria brought before this Court at this time. This commonality
issue must ultimately be resolved at some time and it will ultimately end up being
decided by the Supreme Court anyway, so why not now?

This will avoid

additional delays and appeals, so this case can move ahead more quickly to a final
resolution.
The trial court conceded that the other three of the four Rule 23 class
action requirements are met in this case. R. 4227-4228 ("the Court will assume
that requirements three and four regarding typicality of claims and adequacy of
representation have been met" (emphasis added)). Numerosity is also present.
R. 4229-4230 ("the Court will assume for now that the numerosity requirement
has been met").
However, the court found that "common issues" did not predominate
because of application of the totality of circumstances standard.

12/22/06

Provisional Order, R. 4231-4239. The court observed that "there are numerous
other individual questions that would be involved" (R. 4237), that damages could
not "be calculated using a mathematical formula" (R. 4239), and that this would
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result in "numerous individual mini-trials that would defeat the desired efficiency
of having a class action case."

R. 4239.

The court went on to list those

"individual" factors that precluded commonality and thus class certification,
including "how much investigation has been done on the case prior to the request
[for a consent]," "the likelihood of settlement without a trial," whether or not
liability or causation "was aggressively contested," the "complexity of the case," and
the "experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer" for the recipient. R. 4237
(other similar "individual inquiries" were listed). The court concluded "there is
little question that the individual questions involved in this fact-intensive inquiry
would predominate over the common question in this case," R. 4194, p. 44.
However, it is clear from Houghton HI that these concerns are quite
irrelevant if the three common factors listed above, which apply to "all cases," are
the common class requirements.

For example, if the State must pay its

proportionate fair share of the attorney fees on a lien recovery by recipient's
attorney with consent, and all three of those common criteria are met, what
possible difference would it make whether or not the underlying tort litigation was
risky or not? Or the extent of the experience level of plaintiffs counsel? Or any
of the other criteria listed by the trial court? 12/22/06 Provisional Order, R. 42367. None of those factors make any difference as to whether or not there was a lien
recovery by recipient's attorney, with consent. In other words, since none of those
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factors listed in the trial court's order is relevant, the class should simply be
certified with the Houghton III, 11 49 criteria as the common issues that unite the
class. These three common criteria are fair, easily understood and capable of
simple, mathematical calculation. Accordingly, this class action is an ideal remedy
for a factual dispute such as this.
POINT IV
~ Full Discovery Would Assist in Rapid Resolution ~
FULL DISCOVERY WOULD ASSIST IN MOVING THE CASE
FORWARD TO RAPID RESOLUTION BECAUSE RELEVANT
INFORMATION NECESSARY TO DETERMINING CLASS
MEMBERSHIP HAS BEEN EXTREMELY DIFFICULT OR
IMPOSSIBLE TO GET GIVEN THE LIMITED DISCOVERY
ALLOWED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
In September 2005, this Court ordered full discovery on remand.
Houghton HI, 1111 38, 28 (not allowing factual development under the general
holding of McCoy "would artificially and illogically restrict discovery and,
concomitantly, the size of the potential class." Houghton III, U 38). Until "the facts
surrounding the claims of each potential class member have been developed, it will
be impossible for the court to assess whether they fall within the general holding
of McCoy" Houghton III, H 38 (emphasis added). Despite this full-discovery
admonition, the trial court instead immediately focused on decertification and
allowed only limited discovery.

-40-

At the first hearing after Houghton III, on January 13, 2006, the trial
court suggested sua sponte:
Let me tell you where I think we are with respect to this case. There
remains to be decided a Motion to Decertify the Class and I think
that we need to get that decided and find out whether or not we're
going to he proceeding as a class action before we can really proceed
any further in this case.

So there is, at least on the basis of the record before me, no common
issue that would justify the case continuing as a class action but I
want to be fully informed on that issue and rereading the briefs, the
State's position was that there is no need for discovery for me to
determine that the individual claims predominate over any common
questions that may exist in this case.

So this is how I propose to proceed. I would like the State to
respond fully to plaintiffs' request for production of documents with
respect to 50 claims. . . .
R. 4337, Official Transcript 01/13/06 Hearing, pps. 1-3, prepared by Carolyn
Erickson, CSR, on 7/19/07; R. 2013, hearing of 1/13/06 (emphasis added).
A few months later, at the request of plaintiffs, this was expanded to
allow discovery on all of the potential class members, but only to a severely
limited scope. For example, counsel was prohibited from contacting the attorneys
or the Medicaid recipients on the underlying lien. Plaintiffs were allowed only one
deposition. Most importantly, the State was not required to specify, admit or deny
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the existence of class criteria as to the 2,786 potential cases. Sec Official Transcript
01/13/06 Hearing, R. 4337; R. 2162, p.4.
Thus, before any discovery had even taken place, the focus was to be
on potential decertification.

The trial court's encouragement to file another

motion for decertification found willing ears, and Defendants did exactly that on
Februarv 17, 2006. R. 2087. Class decertification was confirmed as a "final order"
on February 15, 2007, 11 years after the class was first certified. R. 4291. See also
Facts 1 and 2.

,

The trial court has enabled the State in its repeated attempts to delay
and limit discovery. Time and time again "the State fired up its motion machine"
{Houghton III, H 11) and frustrated each discovery attempt with motions for a
protective order or for summary judgment, so that no discovery was had until
2006. R. 106, 608 and 802. Judge Quinn's 2003 ruling limiting the scope of
discovery was appealed and this Court held that the "district court adopted an
erroneously narrow view of our holding in McCoy " Houghton III, 1f 50. This Court
reversed and remanded with "instructions to modify the scope of the discovery
order consistent with this opinion." Id. Instead, the trial court allowed only
narrow discovery focused on whether the class should be decertified. Fact 1 above;
Official Transcript 01/13/06 Hearing, R. 4337; R. 2047, Order Re: Production of
Documents, Confidentiality, and Briefing of Class Certification of Issues.
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Nearly every attempt by Plaintiffs to get relevant and crucial
information through discovery has been frustrated by the State and tolerated by
the trial court. Plaintiffs need information, including requiring the State to specify
for every claimant what percentage attorney fee was paid by the State, and whether
a request for consent was made. To do this, Plaintiffs will need to take further
depositions of ORS personnel, particularly those who worked during the 19912001 period, before Brent Perry's time. Plaintiffs must not be denied permission
to contact recipients and/or their attorneys for additional information not
contained in the spoliated files (which permission was denied by the trial court).
Pinpoint and targeted Requests for Admission and interrogatories wall provide this
critical information that is necessary to establishing Plaintiffs' case and qualifying
most of the 2786 persons, perhaps more, for class membership.

Therefore,

Plaintiffs request that this Court put an end to the curtailing of discovery and order
full, unrestricted discovery upon remand.
CONCLUSION
The petition, as explained herein, was timely filed and this Court does
have jurisdiction to review the decertification order. The trial court's decertification
order has basically gutted the case. All that remains behind are the relatively
minuscule claims of the four class representatives. The court's decertification order
essentially terminates the litigation, for all practical purposes. Accordingly, at a
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very minimum, it makes sense for this Court to reverse the Decertification Order
and straighten out the lower court's erroneous rulings whereby the trial court
adopted a new, nonstatutory "totality of circumstances" standard for determining
attorney fees, rather than by a "proportionate fee" as determined in HougJiton III.
It makes no sense to defer the decision on this case for the year or so that it will
take to work out these underlying named class members' claims, while the trail
grows colder on the class action which was certified about 12 years ago.
The additional issues in Points III and IV should also be heard at this
time. They are heavily class-related and are critical in determining the size of the
class. Resolution of these issues will be "meaningful" in that rulings thereon will
clear the runway of clutter and move the case forward much more rapidly. These
issues will all have to be resolved at some point in time, and now is a good time to
do it given the procedural posture of the case.
As this Brief is signed, this case is a day shy of entering its thirteenth
year of litigation (it was filed on 10/27/95). It should be a priority to avoid as
much undue delay as possible in order to get this case resolved more quickly. The
trial court's erroneous rulings need correction. This correction, together with the
other pending issues, present a situation in which delay can be avoided and
ultimate resolution of the case aided.
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Addenda
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PAUL HOUGHTON, et al.,
Plaintiff,

ORDER ON MOTION FOR
DECERTIFICATION

vs.
Case No. 950907491
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, THE
OFFICE OF RECOVERY SERVICES, THE
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, et
\al.,

Judge Anthony B. Quinn

Defendants.

The above matter came before the Court on December 14, 2006
for oral argument on the following four motions: Defendants'
Renewed Motion for Decertification of Class Action Status,
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Determining Class
Criteria, Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend the January, 1996 Order
Certifying the Class to Conform to Supreme Court Opinions, and
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Determining that
Consent is Not Required in Certain Cases where the Request would
be Futile or would Result in Questionable Ethical Problems for
Counsel.

All four motions are interrelated and because the

Court's decision on Defendants' Renewed Motion for

UM4

Decertification will necessarily decide the other three motions,
the Court's discussion will focus primarily on the motion for
decertification.
I.

BACKGROUND
This lawsuit was filed on October 27, 1995.

It has been

litigated for over 11 years and has been addressed by the Utah
Supreme Court three times.

Countless motions have been filed and

heard and the underlying law in this case has been developed and
refined over the years both in this case and in other cases.
Because of the many cases the Utah Supreme Court has heard in
this area over the past 11 years, the current lawsuit before the
Court is drastically different than the lawsuit filed in 1995.
A.

Original Claims

The original Complaint filed had seven causes of action, all
of which arose out of essentially one allegation.
alleged that Utah Code Annotated

The Plaintiffs

§ 26-19-5(1), which gave the

State of Utah (the "State") a priority "lien against any proceeds
payable to the recipient by . . . [a] third party," violated a
federal Medicaid statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l), which states
that "[n]o lien may be imposed against the property of any
individual prior to his death on account of medical assistance

2

paid or to be paid on his behalf under the State plan. . ."

All

seven causes of action relied on this allegation that the Utah
lien statute violated federal law.1
B.

Original Class Certification

In addition to the seven causes of action, the original
complaint also requested class certification.

On January 29,

1996, Judge Pat Brian,2 based on an unopposed motion to certify
the matter as a class action, entered an order certifying two
classes.

Judge Brian determined that "there are questions of law

or fact common to the classes, particularly whether or not the
State of Utah violated federal law in asserting liens on the

1

The First Cause of Action was for declaratory and
injunctive relief. The Second Cause of Action was to recover the
money allegedly taken by the State's wrongful liens. The Third
Cause of Action was that the State's lien process violated due
process. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Causes of Action
were respectively for fraud, negligent misrepresentation,
mistake, and civil rights violations based on the purportedly
illegal liens.
2

Three separate judges have presided over this case since
it was filed in 1995. Judge Brian was the original judge on the
case. After Judge Brian's retirement in 1999, the case was
assigned to Judge Ronald Nehring. Judge Anthony Quinn, the
current judge on this case, was assigned to the case in 2003
after Judge Nehring was appointed to be a Utah Supreme Court
Justice.
3
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claims, settlements and judgments of class members to reimburse
itself for Medicaid assistance paid. . . ."
The two classes certified both involved individuals who were
injured by the acts of a third party, became Medicaid recipients,
had medical bills that were paid in whole or in part by the
State, and who subsequently undertook a third party liability
action against the third party who injured them, resulting in the
imposition of a lien by the State.

The first class of plaintiffs

were those who did not retain counsel in pursuing their claims
against liable third parties.

The second class of plaintiffs

were those who did retain counsel in their pursuit of liable
third parties.
C.

Validity of Utah Medicaid Lien

Since this case has been filed, the validity of the State's
Medicaid lien has been addressed in a number of cases.

The Utah

Supreme Court first addressed the validity of the State's
Medicaid liens in 1998, issuing opinions on the subject in two
separate cases on the same day.
In the first case, 5.S. v. State

of

Utah,

a minor was

severely and permanently injured when he was struck by a drunk
driver.

972 P.2d 439, 440 (Utah 1998).

The minor's father

4
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received Medicaid assistance on his behalf and the minor
subsequently reached a settlement agreement against the drunk
driver.

Id.

The State then asserted its statutory lien on part

of the settlement proceeds to recover its Medicaid expenses.

Id.

The trial court refused to allow the State to recover its lien
because, inter

alia,

the trial court found that the State lien

violated the federal Medicaid statute, which prohibited liens
against the property of an individual for medical assistance paid
by Medicaid.

Id.

at 442.

On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court.
Citing a New York Court of Appeals case that had recently faced
the same issue, the Utah Supreme Court held that because the
Medicaid recipient is required to assign to the State its right
to recover medical expenses paid by Medicaid, the State's lien
attaches to the liable third party's property, not to the
Medicaid recipient's property.

S.S.,

972 P.2d at 442.

Therefore, the Utah Medicaid statute did not violate the federal
Medicaid statute because it did not give the State a lien on the
Id.

Medicaid recipient's property.

The validity of the State's lien was also contested in
Wallace

v. Estate

of

Nichole

Jackson,

5

where another minor was

injured in an accident, received Medicaid assistance, and had the
State assert its Medicaid lien on settlement proceeds recovered
by the recipient from a third party.
1998).

Similar to the minor in S.S.,

972 P.2d 446, 447 (Utah
the minor contended that

the State's Medicaid lien violated the federal Medicaid statute.
Id.

The Utah Supreme Court noted that in S.S.,

it had held that

"payments made by a liable third party do not legally become the
property of the recipient until after a valid settlement which
must include reimbursement to the State for Medicaid benefits."
Id.

at 448.

Wallace,

This holding in S.S.

as it had in S.S.,

led the court to conclude in

that "the federal anti-lien statute

is not violated when the State seeks reimbursement . . . "3

Id.

These two cases ended the Plaintiffs' primary allegation that the
State's Medicaid lien violated federal law.

3

The contexts of S.S. and Wallace,
however, were slightly
different. In Wallace,
the State was attempting to recover its
lien in the context of an interpleader action, rather than in
direct litigation with the Medicaid recipient as in
S.S..
Wallace,
972 P.2d at 447. The Utah Supreme Court, however, made
clear that the State's right to recover its lien was not affected
simply because an interpleader had been filed. What mattered was
not the circumstances under which the third party proceeds were
being held, but the fact that the State had a valid lien on the
proceeds. Id. at 448.

6
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However, while the instant case continued in litigation, the
Utah Supreme Court decided State

of Utah v. McCoy,

which held

that in certain circumstances, a Medicaid recipient could recover
attorney fees from the State.
McCoy,

2000 UT 39 SI 20, 999 P.2d 572.

In

the Medicaid recipient had complied with the Medicaid

statute by requesting consent from the State to represent the
State's claim against the third party.

Id.

at ! 3.

After the

State refused to grant consent, the Medicaid recipient excluded
the State's claim in his recovery efforts against the third
party.

Id.

at SIS! 3-4.

Despite the State's denial of consent and

the exclusion of the State's claim, once the Medicaid recipient
had recovered against the third party, the State filed an action
against the Medicaid recipient contending that it was entitled to
recover its lien from the proceeds procured by the recipient.
Id.

at SI 6.
Despite the unfairness of allowing the State to satisfy its

lien after the Medicaid recipient had complied with the statute
by requesting consent and excluding the State's claim, the Utah
Supreme Court found that the Medicaid statute permitted such a
result.

McCoy,

2000 UT at SISI 11-12.

However, the court also

found that where the State satisfied its lien through the efforts

7
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of the Medicaid recipient's attorney, the State was responsible
to pay the recipient reasonable attorney fees.

Id.

at St 18.

Therefore, McCoy opened the door for at least some of the
Plaintiffs in this case to continue the litigation since all of
the Class II Plaintiffs had retained attorneys and therefore
could potentially recover some of their attorney fees from the
State.
Although the Utah Supreme Court's decisions in S.S.
Wallace

and

had ended the Plaintiffs' claim that the State's lien

violated federal law, the Plaintiffs continued to litigate the
validity of the State's lien contending that although the lien
itself did not violate federal law, the lien's "priority" status
did.

The Utah Supreme Court rejected the Plaintiffs' argument in

Houghton

v.

Dep't

of

Health,

repeating its prior holdings that

the State's lien was not a lien on the Medicaid recipient's
property, but on the third party's property.
(Utah 2002) .

57 P. 3d 1067, 1069

Therefore, the "priority" status of the lien was

irrelevant and did not violate the federal Medicaid statute.4

Id.

4

The Plaintiffs filed a writ of certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court, but the court declined to hear the appeal.
Houghton
v. Dep't of Health,
538 U.S. 945, 945 (2003). However,
three years later in an unrelated case, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that federal Medicaid law prohibited a state from recovering
8
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As for recovery of attorney fees under McCoy,
Supreme Court further clarified McCoy in State
Streight

of

the Utah
Utah

and in a third appeal in the current case.

v.
Streight,

In

the Utah Supreme Court held that a Medicaid recipient could not
recover attorney fees from the State unless it had requested
consent from the State to represent the State's claim.
88 St 16, 108 P. 3d 690.

2004 UT

In other words, requesting consent was

mandatory in order to recover any attorney fees from the State.
The court further clarified McCoy in the current case's third
trip to the Utah Supreme Court by holding that, unlike the
consent requirement, a Medicaid recipient's failure to exclude
the State's claim did not prevent the Medicaid recipient from
recovering attorney fees.

Houghton,

2005 UT 63 1 48, 125 P.3d

860.

an amount in excess of the recipient's recovery for medical'
expenses. Arkansas
Dep't of Health and Human Services
v.
Ahlborn,
126 S. Ct. 1752 (2006). This ruling effectively
overruled Houghton's
holding that the State of Utah could recover
its Medicaid payments from third party settlement proceeds that
did not represent a recovery of medical costs. In light of
Ahlborn,
the Plaintiffs filed a motion asking the Court to
reinstate its original claims. However, because Ahlborn
was not
a direct appeal from Houghton and the issue had already been
definitely decided by the Utah Supreme Court, the Court denied
the motion on the basis that the Court had no authority to
revisit the issue.

9
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As the above discussion shows, the legal landscape has
changed dramatically since this case was filed and certified as a
class action in 1995.

The essential cause of action of the

original complaint is vastly different from the current claim for
attorney fees.

After 11 years of litigation and several Utah

Supreme Court decisions, the only viable claim left is an implied
cause of action for attorney fees based on McCoy,
years after this litigation commenced.

decided five

However, despite these

dramatic changes, the class has never been reevaluated in light
of the current state of the law after McCoy.

For this reason,

the Court will discuss the elements needed for a McCoy cause of
action and then decide whether the class should be revised to
conform to McCoy or should instead be decertified.
II.

Elements of McCoy Cause of Action
As discussed above, the Plaintiffs' original claims have

been rejected by the Utah Supreme Court and the only remaining
claim left is the implied cause of action for attorney fees
recognized in McCoy.

The Court will now review the elements that

must be met under McCoy in order to recover attorney fees from
the State.

10
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A.

Plaintiffs' Prima Facie

Case Under McCoy

In order to recover attorney fees from the State, each
Plaintiff must show the following: (1) the Plaintiff was
represented by counsel in a third party liability claim, (2) the
Plaintiff requested consent from the State to represent the
State's Medicaid claim, (3) the State satisfied its Medicaid lien
from proceeds recovered through the efforts of the Plaintiff, and
(4) the State did not pay the reasonable attorney fees it was
obligated to pay the Plaintiff.

Each of these elements will be

discussed in turn.
1.

Represented by Counsel

Both the Plaintiffs and the State agree that in order to
recover under McCoy,

the Medicaid recipient must have been

represented by counsel in a third party liability claim.

All

that a Plaintiff must show under this element is that the
recipient was represented by counsel at the time the lien was
paid.
2.

Request for Consent

The second element of a McCoy cause of action is that the
Plaintiff must have requested consent from the State to represent
the State's Medicaid claim.

Although the Plaintiffs generally

11

acknowledge the consent requirement, the Plaintiffs ask this
Court to find that where a request for consent would have been
futile because of purported State policies, the consent
requirement should be "relaxed."

However, there is nothing in

the statute or case law that justifies relaxing the McCoy consent
requirement.

Utah

Code Annotated

§ 26-19-7(1)(a) expressly

states that,
A recipient may not file a claim, commence an action,
or settle, compromise, release, or waive a claim
against a third party for recovery of medical costs
for an injury, disease, or disability for which the
department has provided or has become obligated to
provide medical assistance, without
the
department's
written
consent.
(1995) (emphasis added).
This statutory language requiring consent5 is mandatory and
provides no "futility" exception or any other exception.
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of
Appeals have repeatedly stated that a request for consent is a
prerequisite to recovering attorney fees from the State.
Camp v.

Office

of Recovery

Services,

See

779 P.2d 242, 248 (Utah Ct.

App. 1989) ("Although subsection 26-19-7(4) may authorize an
award of attorney fees to some Medicaid recipients, the fees must

5

Of course, in order to obtain consent, one must first
request consent, which is the requirement at issue here.
12
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be in connection with the commencement of an action, and the
action

must be commenced with

(emphasis added); McCoy,
7(1)(a)], a recipient

the State's

written

consent.")

2000 UT at 1 14 ("Thus, under [§ 26-19-

must seek

the State's

consent

before

attempting to recover from a third party . . .") (emphasis
added)/ Houghton,

2005 UT at 11 39-40 ("In McCoy,

we concluded

that the State was obligated to pay a proportionate share of the
plaintiff's attorney fees because the plaintiff complied with
section 2 6-19-7 . . . .
McCoy had requested

We based

consent

this

conclusion

to pursue

the State's

on the fact
claim.

that

. . .

Where Medicaid recipients failed to comply with the statute, they
were not entitled to a contribution from the State for their
attorney fees.") (emphasis added).
Indeed, the need for the Medicaid recipient to request
consent before recovering any attorney fees from the State was
directly at issue in Streight.

In Streight,

the issue before the

court was whether the Medicaid recipient could recover some of
his attorney fees from the State even though the recipient had
not requested the State's consent prior to settling with the
liable third party.

Streight,

2004 UT at 1 1.

The recipient

argued that he was entitled to attorney fees because the Medicaid
13

statute did not explicitly provide that forfeiture of attorney
fees was the consequence of not requesting the State's consent.
Id.

at 5 13.
The Utah Supreme Court rejected this argument, however, and

after noting that the plain terms of the statute did not address
any affirmative obligation on the State to pay attorney fees, and
explained that
In McCoy, on grounds of fairness, we interpreted the
statute to imply an obligation on the part of the
State to pay fees where the attorney acted in
compliance with the statute, requesting consent to
pursue an action and then preserving the State's
independent right to recover by excluding the State's
claim from any action filed on behalf of the injured
party. In doing so, McCoy struck a balance between
the State's interest in protecting itself from
collusive efforts to place otherwise reimbursable
funds beyond its reach and the interest of private
attorneys
in
being
compensated
for
obtaining
recoveries benefitting the State. This balance would
be upset were we to extend McCoy to situations where
a Medicaid recipient's private attorney does not
bother to seek the State's consent to his or her
action. Id. at SI 13 (emphasis added) .
In order to avoid upsetting the balance established by
McCoy,

the Utah Supreme Court in Streight

declined "to extend the

State's contingent obligation to pay attorney fees . . .

to cases

where attorneys fail to seek the State's consent to actions

14

seeking recovery of Medicaid recipients' medical costs."

Id.

at

SI 16 (emphasis added) .
In light of the Utah Supreme Court's clear holding that
request for the State's consent is a prerequisite to recovering
attorney fees, this Court declines to "relax" the statutory
request requirement and recognize a "futility" exception.

The

statute plainly requires the recipient to seek consent from the
State.

If any Plaintiff chose to ignore the statutory

requirements of § 26-19-7 because the Plaintiff felt the request
would have been "futile/' he did so at his own peril.

Therefore,

a Plaintiff must show that he or she requested consent from the
State to recover attorney fees under

McCoy.6

3. Satisfaction of Lien through Counsel's Efforts
The third element a Plaintiff must show in order to recover
attorney fees is that the State satisfied its lien from proceeds
procured through the Plaintiff's efforts.

See Houghton,

2005 UT

6

The Plaintiffs also argue that the retainer agreements
were unethical and therefore the Plaintiffs contend that refusing
to sign these agreements should excuse the failure to obtain
consent. However, the prerequisite to obtaining attorney fees is
not obtaining consent, but simply requesting consent. If the
recipient's attorney requested consent, but was unable to obtain
consent because he refused to sign what he felt was an unethical
agreement, the recipient is still entitled to attorney fees in
that case because consent was requested.
15
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at 1 49 ("Accordingly, in all cases where the State satisfies its
lien from proceeds procured through the efforts of a private
attorney, the State is responsible for its proportionate share of
attorney fees . . . " ) .

Neither the State nor the Plaintiffs

dispute this element, but it should be noted that the Plaintiff's
burden on this element is light.

The Plaintiff need only show

that it was represented by counsel at the time it obtained a
recovery from the third party to meet its burden.

If the

represented Plaintiff can show he obtained a third party
recovery, the presumption will be that the State satisfied its
lien from proceeds procured through the Plaintiff's efforts.
Houghton,

See

2005 UT at 1 49 ("moreover, in those cases where a

settlement or judgment is obtained through the efforts of a
private attorney, any claim by the State that it recovered its
lien through its own efforts will be subject to scrutiny.").

As

discussed further below, the State will then have the burden to
show that it satisfied its lien through its own efforts and not
the recipient's efforts.
4.

Payment of Reasonable Attorney Fees

The fourth element a Plaintiff must show is that the State
failed to pay the reasonable attorney fees the State owed the

16
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Plaintiff for procuring the State's recovery.

This element

necessarily involves deciding how a reasonable fee is determined.
The method of determining a reasonable fee is the primary dispute
between the parties.

The Plaintiffs contend that the State is

required to pay the same percentage of attorney fees on its lien
reimbursement that the recipient paid to his own attorney.
Plaintiffs seek a presumption that this is 33%.7

The

The State

counters that the determination of attorney fees is a fact
intensive inquiry rather than a simple across the board 33%.
In order to resolve this dispute, it is important to examine
the basis for allowing a recipient to recover attorney fees from
the State.

Examining § 26-19-7, there is clearly no express

requirement for the State to pay attorney fees.

See

Streight,

2004 UT at % 13 ("the plain terms of [§ 26-19-7] do not address

7

Despite Plaintiffs' contention, it is this Court's
experience in reviewing minor settlements that the percentage for
attorney fees in personal injury claims are often less than 33%.
The Court has seen numerous cases where the percentage is 25% or
some other percentage than 33%, including cases involving the law
firms of the individuals who have filed affidavits stating that
the standard contingency fee is 33%. Moreover, even when the
agreed percentage is 33%, it often happens where the case will
settle and the recipient will pay less than the 33% agreed
amount. Therefore, Plaintiffs' contention that 33% is almost
always the percentage paid by the recipient does not excuse proof
of the actual percentage in each case as a factor in determining
the reasonable fee.
17
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any affirmative obligation on the part of the State to pay
attorney fees.")

However, in McCoy,

the Utah Supreme Court faced

a circumstance where a Medicaid recipient had complied with the
statute in every way, was denied consent by the State to
represent it, and then had the State reimburse itself from the
recipient attorney's third party recovery after the recipient had
excluded the State's lien.

2000 UT at 5? 2-6.

Confronted by such a circumstance, the Utah Supreme Court
later explained that "[i]n McCoy,

on grounds of fairness, we

interpreted the statute to imply an obligation on the part of the
State to pay fees where the attorney acted in compliance with the
statute, requesting consent to pursue an action and then
preserving the State's independent right to recover by excluding
the State's claim from any action filed on behalf of the injured
party."8

Streight,

2004 UT at 1 13.

Therefore, the obligation to

pay attorney fees is not from any affirmative requirement in ths

The Utah Supreme Court later clarified that excluding the
State's lien was not a prerequisite to recovering attorney fees.
See Houghton,
2005 UT at % 48 ("We accordingly hold that the
State's obligation to pay its share of attorney fees is not
dependent upon whether the recipient expressly excluded the
State's claim . . .") .
18
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statute, but from an implied obligation read into the statute by
the McCoy court.
In its most recent pronouncement on the subject, the Utah
Supreme Court declared that McCoy's

ruling requiring the State to

pay attorney fees was based in equity.9

See Houghton,

2005 UT at

1 43 (noting that barring recovery of attorney fees where the
recipient did not exclude the State's claim would "defeat the
equitable basis for our ruling in McCoy") .

Therefore it is

important to note that requiring the State to pay attorney fees
where it denied consent should be viewed as an equitable
interpretation of § 26-19-7 rather than as an express requirement
of it.
In this light, the Court will examine what the Utah Supreme
Court has stated regarding the State's obligation to pay attorney
In McCoy,

fees.

the Utah Supreme Court never used the phrase

"proportionate" to describe the State's share of attorney fees.
Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court carefully divided § 26-19-7(4) and
held that the "proportionate share" language in the statute

9

As used here, the term equity is not used in the sense of
a law/equity dichotomy, but as a synonym for fairness.
19

referred only to costs, not attorney fees.10

McCoy,

2000 UT at 1

16.
Instead, the McCoy court referred to the State's obligation
to pay "reasonable" attorney fees.

2000 UT at 11 19-20.

The

court explained that under § 26-19-7, no matter what avenue the
State chooses to recover its lien, the State is responsible for
paying reasonable attorney fees.

The court stated:

The State may (1) take action directly against the
third party, for which the State pays its own expenses;
(2) grant consent to recipients seeking to pursue the
State's claim, whereby the State's recovery will be
reduced by reasonable attorney fees and, if any, its
proportionate share of the costs of an action; or (3)
refuse consent and proceed against the recipient after
the recipient recovers from the third party, in which
case the State's recovery shall be reduced by
reasonable attorney fees.
McCoy, 2000 UT at 1 19
(emphasis added).
Notably, under the second option, the McCoy court uses
"reasonable" to refer to the attorney fees and "proportionate" to
refer to the costs.

This is consistent with the court's

separation of the attorney fees section from the "proportionate"
costs section under the statute.

Id.

at SI 16.

The Plaintiffs repeatedly attempt to connect the
"proportionate costs" section of § 26-19-7(4) to the attorney
fees section, but the Utah Supreme Court rejected this approach
in McCoy. 2000 UT at If 16.
20
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Also notable is that whether the State grants consent under
the second option or denies consent under the third option, in
both cases, it is obligated to pay "reasonable" attorney fees.
In other words, the State should pay fees that meet the standard
of reasonableness of attorney fees regardless of whether it
grants or denies consent.

Based on this, the process to

determine the State's attorney fees when it denies consent should
be the same process that is used to determine the State's
attorney fees when it grants consent.
The process for determining attorney fees when consent is
given can be gleaned from § 26-19-7.

Essentially, § 26-19-7(3)-

(4) states that where the State gives consent, it must state the
terms of the consent.

However, the statute limits the discretion

of the State in stating the terms of its consent by prohibiting
the State from paying more than 33% of its recovery in attorney
fees.

There is nothing in § 26-19-7 that requires the State to

pay the same percentage of attorney fees to the recipient as the
recipient is paying to his attorney.

Indeed, if the standard fee

is 331/3%, the statute prevents the state from paying the 1/3%.

The

statute instead presumes that once the recipient requests
consent, the State will examine the circumstances of the Medicaid

21
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recipient's claim against the third party and determine a
reasonable attorney fee that should be paid.11
In other words, the standard for determining reasonable fees
is a totality of the circumstances standard.

However, there are

two factors that are of paramount importance in determining
reasonable attorney's fees: (1) the fee arrangement between the
recipient and his counsel; and (2) the case status at the time
consent was requested.
The first important factor is the fee arrangement
recipient's counsel agreed to accept to prosecute the claim
against the third party tort-feasor.

Where a lawyer and a client

have agreed to a particular arrangement, that arrangement is
strong evidence of what constitutes a reasonable attorney's fee
in the case.
In the vast majority of cases, the fee arrangement will be a
contingency fee agreement based upon the entire recovery,
including the lien amount.

In those cases, the agreed percentage

11

Of course, the determination by the State must be
reasonable and made in good faith. Although the plain language
of § 26-19-7 (3) might support an argument that the State can
require any terms it chooses, even unreasonable ones, McCoy is
clear that the attorney fees must be "reasonable," even where the
State is entitled under § 26-19-7(3) to state the terms of its
consent. 2000 UT at ^ 19.
22
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is presumptively reasonable based on what was known about the
case when the agreement was reached.

In some cases, the fee

arrangement may be a contingency percentage based upon the net
recovery to the recipient, excluding the lien amount.

Any such

case would not be part of the proposed class, because the lawyer
and. not the recipient would be the proper party in interest. In
some cases, the fee contract between the lawyer and the recipient
may call for some other basis of computing the fee, such as an
hourly rate or fixed fee.

In these cases, the Court would have

to examine the fee arrangement and determine the State's fair
share based upon a totality of the circumstances.
The second factor is the case status at the time the
recipient requests consent.

If the recipient requests consent

near the beginning of the case when the status is the same as
when the fee percentage was set, the percentage of attorney fees
owed by the State would likely be the same.

However, if the

recipient requests consent after investigations have been
completed and the merits of the case are more clear, the State's
attorney fees may be lower if in fact the risk of non recovery is

23

less.12

For example, as was often the case, if the recipient

requested consent from the State after the recipient received an
acceptable settlement offer from the third party, the State's
attorney fees would be less because there was little risk of not
recovering.13

12

Of course in some cases, investigation will show a higher
risk of non recovery. However, because the attorney and the
recipient presumably accounted for the risk that further
investigation would show a higher risk of non recovery when they
negotiated the percentage for attorney fees, the State will never
be required to pay a higher percentage of attorney fees than the
recipient paid. In other words, the percentage of attorney fees
the recipient paid will act as a ceiling on the percentage of
attorney fees the State must pay.
13

This Court recognizes that where the recipient's attorney
has done a substantial amount of work prior to requesting
consent, the State arguably gets a free ride up to that point
since the State's attorney fee will likely be lower under those
circumstances. However, the State should not be punished where
the recipient knows of his claim, but waits to inform the State.
The clock on the State's obligation to pay fees should not begin
to run until the State is put to the choice of deciding which of
its collection options to choose. Section 26-19-7 clearly
contemplates the recipient requesting consent from the State as
soon as possible. To the extent the recipient chooses to wait to
complete his statutory obligations, that choice should weigh on
the recipient, not the State. This result is consistent with
Streight's holding that if the recipient does not seek the
State's consent until after the claim has been settled or
resolved, the State is not obligated to pay any attorney fees to
the recipient, despite the apparent free ride to the State.
See
Streight,
2004 UT at 1 14 ("attorneys filing cases on behalf of
Medicaid recipients may avoid the injustice of working to obtain
a recovery without being paid simply by complying with the
provisions of [§ 2 6 - 1 9 - 7 ] . . . "
24
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As a result, where the recipient makes his request in close
proximity to when the recipient and his attorney entered into a
fee agreement, a presumption will arise that the State's
percentage of fees are the same percentage as the recipient's
fees.

However, it is likely that in most cases, there is a

sufficient difference between the time the attorney is retained
and the time the consent is requested that the presumption that
the attorney fees are proportionate to the recipient's fees will
not arise, thus requiring a more fact intensive inquiry.14
In light of this, this Court cannot accept Plaintiffs'
contention that the attorney fees will always be the same
percentage as the recipient's attorney fees.

As the above

discussion shows, to the degree that there is less risk of non
recovery compared to when the recipient signed the retainer
agreement, the State's attorney fee may correspondingly be less.
Therefore, reasonable attorney fees under McCoy cannot simply
mean whatever percentage of fees the recipient agreed to pay his
attorney.

14

The resulting range in the percentage of attorney fees
owed by the State will be somewhere between 20% to 33%. Notably,
this is the same range of percentages that were employed where
the State granted consent and entered into a fee agreement with
the recipient.
25

This rejection of Plaintiffs' argument accords with McCoy
itself.

The McCoy court concluded that "[w]e affirm the judgment

of the trial court to the extent it held that the State is
entitled to recover $8,846.92 from McCoy, but reverse to the
extent the court failed to reduce the State's recovery by McCoy's
reasonable attorney fees for procuring the State's share of the
settlement proceeds." McCoy,

2000 UT at 1 20.

As this statement

reveals, the McCoy court knew the exact amount of the State lien
at issue.

If the McCoy court intended that the State's attorney

fees should simply be 33%, it would have been easy to so indicate
and even determine the precise amount the State owed in attorney
fees.
Instead, the court remanded it to the district court for a
determination of "reasonable" attorney fees.

This Court knows of

no case where "reasonable attorney fees" refers to a simple
mathematical percentage.

The court's remand action and use of

the word "reasonable" suggests instead that the court had a more
fact intensive inquiry in mind that had to be undertaken by the
trial court.
Nothing in the Utah Supreme Court's later cases or in the
Plaintiffs' memoranda convinces this Court otherwise.

The
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Plaintiffs make much of the fact that the Utah Supreme Court
later uses the term "proportionate" in Houghton.
39, 49.

2005 UT at ff

However, there is nothing in the court's use of the term

"proportionate" to suggest that they are rejecting its use of the
term "reasonable" in McCoy or that they intend "proportionate" to
mean the same attorney fees as paid by the recipient to his
attorney.

Indeed, the Houghton

court also refers to the State's

obligation to pay its "fair share" of attorney fees, which is
more reminiscent of the "reasonable" language from McCoy.

Id.

at

1 40.
The Plaintiffs also spend a large amount of their brief
contending that, under McCoy and Houghton,

the State has no

discretion in deciding whether to pay 33% in attorney fees.
While the Plaintiffs are correct that the State has no discretion
in whether to pay attorney fees, neither McCoy or Houghton

held

that the State must pay the same percentage of attorney fees as
does the recipient.

The State's attempt to bootstrap a 33%

attorney fee requirement on to the Utah Supreme Court's holding
that the State must pay reasonable attorney fees is an
unsupported logical leap.

27

Finally, the Plaintiffs focus a great deal on

McCoy's

language that "the State must pay the attorney fees incurred in
procuring the State's share of the settlement proceeds.7'
at 1 18 (emphasis added).

2000 UT

Admittedly, this language is seemingly

more consistent with the Plaintiffs' approach than with the
Court's approach.

Ultimately, however, neither the Court's

approach nor the Plaintiffs' approach is completely consistent
with the various phrases used in McCoy and subsequent cases.
Indeed, no approach is going to be completely consistent with the
Utah Supreme Court's language because the language itself is not
completely consistent.15

This is likely because the Utah Supreme

Court has never directly addressed how attorney fees under McCoy
should be calculated.

In light of this fact, it should not be

surprising that the court has not used uniform language when
referencing an award of attorney fees under

McCoy.

Hence, although the Court's approach may not fit perfectly
with all the Utah Supreme Court's language, it is still

15

This can clearly be seen by the fact that the State
emphasizes the McCoy court's language of "reasonable" attorney
fees while the Plaintiffs focus on the Houghton
court's language
of "proportionate" attorney fees. While "reasonable" and
"proportionate" are not irreconcilable, they also cannot be said
to be synonomous and there is an inherent tension between the
two.
28
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preferable to the Plaintiffs' approach because the Plaintiffs'
approach is not only inconsistent with the "reasonable" language,
but it is also inconsistent with the theoretical framework of the
McCoy decision and with the plain language of § 26-19-7.

Given

that the Utah Supreme Court has simply not yet explained how
attorney fees should be calculated, this Court has adopted the
approach that seems most consistent with § 26-19-7, with the
circumstances of the McCoy holding, and with the Utah Supreme
Court's direction on the subject.

Therefore, for the above

reasons, this Court finds that "reasonable attorney fees" under
McCoy should be determined by examining the totality of the
circumstances under which the recipient procured the State's
recovery focusing on the percentage the recipient agreed to pay
and when the recipient first requested consent.
Hence, to meet the fourth element in a McCoy cause of the
action, the Plaintiff must show that the State did not pay the
full amount of reasonable attorney fees it owed to the recipient
using the above totality of the circumstances standard.

If the

Plaintiff meets his burden to show each of the above four
elements, he will have made a prima facie case for recovery of
attorney fees under McCoy.
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B.

Defenses by the State

If the Plaintiff successfully makes out a prima

facie

case

for attorney fees by showing the above four elements, the burden
will then shift to the State to show any applicable defenses.
The Utah Supreme Court has identified two potential defenses that
the State may use to avoid paying attorney fees: (1) the State
can show that it satisfied its lien through its own efforts, or
(2) the State can show it was prevented from collecting against
the third party because of the Plaintiff's lack of cooperation.
A successful showing of either of these defenses means the State
is not liable for any attorney fees to the recipient.
1.

State Procured its Own Lien

As discussed previously, if the Plaintiff procured a
recovery from the third party, the presumption will be that the
Plaintiff procured the State's recovery.

In order to overcome

this presumption, the State must show that it satisfied its lien
through proceeds procured through its own efforts and not through
the Plaintiff's efforts.

However,

[t]he State will not be able to establish that it
recovered its lien through its own efforts simply
by showing that it sent notification of its lien to
potentially
liable
third
parties
with
the
expectation that they will pay the State directly
from the settlement proceeds generated through the
30
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efforts of a recipient's private attorney.
To
avoid paying its fair share of attorney fees after
it has refused to grant consent, the State must
demonstrate
that
its
lien
was paid
wholly
independent of the settlement or judgment procured
by the recipient's private attorney.
Houghton,

2005 at SI 49.

However, where the State successfully

shows that its lien was paid "wholly independent" of the
Plaintiff's efforts, the State will not be liable for any
attorney fees.
2.

Lack of Cooperation

The second potential defense is where the State can show the
recipient's lack of cooperation prevented the State from
recovering.

In McCoy,

the State of Utah had argued that the

Medicaid recipient was not entitled to attorney fees because he
had failed to cooperate with the State.

2000 UT at 518 n.4.

Although the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that "a recipient
has a duty to cooperate with the State in identifying and
providing information to assist the State in pursuing" liable
third parties, the court found that in McCoy's case, the lack of
cooperation did not prejudice the State's claim against the third
party.

Id.

Therefore, the court concluded that it did not need

to address "whether the legislature intended not to award
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attorney fees to a recipient whose ^failure to cooperate'
prevents the State from recovering from a third party."

Id.

Although the Utah Supreme Court did not determine whether a
recipient's failure to cooperate could provide a defense to the
State, this Court believes that such a defense should be
available.

Where the recipient's lack of cooperation prevents

the State from having the opportunity to pursue its lien against
the third party, the Medicaid statute has been frustrated.
In Streight,

the court found that not requiring the

recipient to request consent would prejudice the State because
the State would "[lose] its ability to choose the most efficient
vehicle for its recovery."

2004 UT at SI 12.

Just as failure to

request consent from the State robs the State of its ability to
choose its avenue of recovery, a recipient's lack of cooperation
can produce the same result.

If the lack of cooperation hinders

the State from pursuing its own recovery, then its option of
pursuing its own recovery has been taken away.

Therefore, if the

State can show that a Plaintiff's lack of cooperation prevented
it from pursuing its own recovery, the State will not be liable
for any attorney fees to the Plaintiff.

32

III. Application of Rule 23
Now that the elements of a McCoy cause of action have been
reviewed, the Court can now determine whether this matter should
continue as a class action or instead should be decertified.

The

current class includes all those Medicaid recipients who were
represented by counsel, who recovered against liable third
parties, and who had the State satisfy its lien from the
recipient's third party proceeds.

The question now is whether to

certify a smaller class in light of McCoy or whether to simply
decertify the entire class.

The answer depends on whether a

smaller class based on McCoy would satisfy the Rule 23 class
certification requirements.

If the new class would not satisfy

Rule 23, then no new classes should be certified and the current
class should be decertified.
As an initial matter, Courts uniformly hold that a class
action may be decertified if it no longer meets the criteria for
class action.
N.A.,

See, e.g. Miera

v.

First

Security

Bank of

Utah,

925 F.2d 1237, 1242 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting that Rule

23(c) (1) allows for decertification any time before a decision on
the merits).
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Moreover, whether to certify or decertify a class is within
the sound discretion of the trial court.
Fuels

Corp.,

See

Richardson

v.

Ariz.

614 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah 1980) ("If the criteria of

Rule 23 are complied with, it is within the sound discretion of
the district court to determine whether a suit, or some of the
issues in a lawsuit, should proceed as a class action."); Call
City

of

West

Jordan,

v.

727 P.2d 180, 183 (Utah 1986) ("We will

reverse a trial court's decision on class action status only when
it is shown that the trial court misapplied the law or abused its
discretion"); Miera, 925 F.2d at 1242 ("The abuse of discretion
standard applies not only to an initial determination to certify
a class, but also to a subsequent determination to decertify.").
Rule 23(a) of the Utah Rules

of

Civil

Procedure

requirements for continued class certification.

lays out the

It states:

One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all only if (1)
the class so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or
fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses
of the representative parties are typical of the
claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.
Of these four requirements, only the first two are disputed
between the parties.

Therefore, the Court will assume that
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requirements three and four regarding typicality of claims and
adequacy of representation have been met.
In addition to Rule 23(a), in order to maintain class
status, the Plaintiffs must also qualify under Rule 23(b) (1),
(b)(2), or (b)(3).

Both the Plaintiffs and the State agree that

if the class is to continue, it must be under Rule 23(b)(3),
which requires that "the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members . . . " ) .

The Court will now determine

whether the relevant requirements for continued class
certification have been met.
A. Numerosity
In order to maintain class certification under Rule
23(a)(1), the class must be so numerous that joinder of all
members would be impractical.
the numerosity requirement.
v.

There is no set number that meets
See

Gen.

Tel.

Co. of

the

N.W.,

Inc.

EOEC, 446 U.S. 318, 330 (1980) ("The numerosity requirement

requires examination of the specific facts of each case and
imposes no absolute limitations.") While most jurisdictions
resist having a set number, many jurisdictions nevertheless hold
that fewer than 20 is inadequate and more than 40 is adequate.
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See,

e.g.

Cox v.

Am. Cast

Iron

Pipe

Co.,

784 F.2d 1546, 1553 (11th

Cir. 1986) ("while there is no fixed numerosity rule, generally
less than twenty-one is inadequate, more than forty adequate,
with numbers between varying according to other factors.")
(quotations omitted).

In Utah, the general rule is that the

"size of the class is not solely determinative of
impracticability." Call,

727 P.2d at 183.

It is still unclear in this case what the size of the class
would be.

According to the State's review of 411 cases, only 28

cases would qualify as members of the class.16

However, not all

potential cases have been viewed and therefore, even if the State
is correct about the 28 cases, there will likely be other cases
discovered.
In any case, it is clear that even in the State's
estimation, there are not so few cases that numerosity is clearly
not met.

On the other hand, it is also clear that there are not

so many cases that size alone would determine that numerosity is
satisfied.

Instead, it appears that the numerosity will not be

16

Of course, the State did not have the benefit of knowing
the Court's approach in determining attorney fees when it
reviewed the cases. The State's approach was likely more
stringent than the Court's approach and so there are probably
more than 28 cases that would qualify.
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determined by the size of the class alone, but on other factors
in addition to size.

These factors will be dealt with in

deciding whether common questions predominate over individual
issues.

Therefore, because numerosity will turn not on the size

of the class, but on other factors, the Court will assume for now
that the numerosity requirement has been met.
B.

Common Questions of Law or Fact

The second requirement for continued class action is that
there must be questions of law or fact common to the class.
Although the rule refers to "questions" in the plural, most
courts find that only one question is required.
Arenson

v.

Whitehall

Convalescent

& Nursing

Home,

See, e.g.
Inc.,

164

F.R.D. 659, 663 (N.D. 111. 1996) (commonality requirement is
satisfied if plaintiffs demonstrate that there is at least one
common question of law or fact).

Because of this, most courts

find that the commonality requirement is easily satisfied.
Baby

Neal

ex rel.

Kanter

v.

Casey,

See

43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994)

(commonality requirement is not demanding because requirement may
be satisfied by a single common issue).
In any case, because the Plaintiffs in this case must show
that the common questions of law or fact predominate over
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individual issues, then the commonality requirement will
necessarily be decided in the predominate section below.

If the

Plaintiffs meet the predominate requirement, they will also meet
the commonality requirement.

On the other hand, if the

Plaintiffs do not meet the predominate requirement, then the
class should be decertified regardless of whether they meet the
commonality requirement.
C.

The Predominance Requirement

The final and most heavily disputed requirement for
continued class certification is that "the questions of law or
fact common to the members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members . . ."
23(b)(3).

UTAH

R.

CIV.

P.

In order for class certification to continue, the

Plaintiffs must show that the common questions of the class
predominate over any individual questions.
The common questions in this matter are the legal questions
that define the McCoy cause of action.

With the exception of how

to determine the amount of reasonable attorney fees the State
must pay, all the relevant legal questions have been resolved by
the Utah Supreme Court in other cases.

Therefore, how attorney

fees should be determined is essentially the only common question
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that remains among the class.

In order to determine whether the

common question of how to calculate attorney fees predominates,
the Court must next identify the individual questions that are
not common to the class.
The first issue over which there are individual
determinations to be made is the issue of whether the recipient
was represented by counsel.

In the vast majority of cases, this

will be a simple determination.

There are, however, at least a

few cases where a recipient was initially represented by counsel,
but where the counsel had withdrawn prior to the time settlement
was reached.

Whether these cases are addressed under the element

of representation by counsel or under the element of whether the
settlement was procured as a result of the attorney's efforts,
some case specific evidence would need to be considered in these
cases to determine whether an attorney's fee is owed.
The second issue represents individual questions as to
whether consent was requested.

Based upon the Affidavits that

have been submitted to the Court analyzing the claims files, the
parties have come up with grossly disparate estimates of the
number of cases in which consent was requested.

It appears,

therefore, that for at least some cases, the Court will have to
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consider evidence and make a factual determination about whether
consent was requested.
The third and most important individual question relates to
the determination of attorney fees.17

In examining this issue, it

will be helpful to divide the class into two different groups.
The first group contains those claims where the State never paid
any attorney fees or discounted its lien, usually because the
State denied consent.

The second group contains those claims

where the State granted consent and accordingly paid some
attorney fees or discounted its lien.18

These two groups are

17

In order to avoid confusion, it should be noted that while
the question of what process should be used to determine the
amount of attorney fees is a question common to the class, the
application of that process involves individual questions. For
example, the Plaintiffs' answer to the question of what process
should be used is that the State should pay the same percentage
of attorney fees as the recipient pays to his attorney, with a
presumption that this percentage is 33%. This answer is
applicable to all members of the class. However, the question of
what particular percentage an individual recipient paid his
attorney is an individual inquiry not common to the class.
18

The critical component of this second group is not whether
the State granted consent, but whether the State paid any
attorney fees or discounted its lien. If the State denied
consent, but nevertheless discounted its lien or paid some
attorney fees, this circumstance would fall within the second
group. Conversely, a circumstance where the State granted
consent, but never paid any fees or discounted its lien would
fall within the first group. Therefore, although whether consent
was given or denied does not determine what group a Plaintiff is
40
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important because the Plaintiffs fitting within the second group
face additional individual inquiries in addition to those found
in the first group.

Each of these groups will be discussed in

turn.
1.

Cases where Consent was Denied or No Attorney Fees
were Paid.

The first group involves those Plaintiffs who received no
attorney fees or discount from the State.

The individual

questions involving these Plaintiffs are primarily questions as
to the amount of reasonable attorney fees.

Although the

Plaintiffs' and the State's dispute has taken place in the
context of whether the common questions predominate, the crux of
their dispute has really been over how reasonable attorney fees
should be calculated.

Both parties' memoranda implicitly

recognize that the predomination issue hinges on who is right on
the attorney fees issue.

If the Plaintiffs are correct that

attorney fees are simply 33% of the lien recovered, then the
common question of how to calculate attorney fees may
predominate.

On the other hand, if the State is correct that the

in, the discussion assumes that normally when the State
consented, it paid attorney fees or discounted its lien and when
the State denied consent, it did neither.
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determination of attorney fees is more than a simple mathematical
formulation, then the common question of how to calculate
attorney fees does not predominate.
As already discussed, this Court has rejected the
Plaintiffs' contention that the State's attorney fees are
presumptively 33% of the lien recovery.

Instead, this Court has

determined that the State's attorney fees are determined by
examining the totality of the circumstances under which the
recipient recovered the State's lien with a special emphasis on
the fee arrangement the recipient attorney agreed to accept, and
the circumstances and risks involved at the time the recipient
requested consent from the State.
The individual questions involved with this comprehensive
inquiry will be as varied as the individual recipient's
circumstances.

The first of the individual questions that will

need to be answered is the amount the recipient agreed to pay his
own attorney.

In those cases, where the fee was based upon an

hourly, flat fee or some other non-percentage fee arrangement,
the Court will have to examine the circumstances of each
individual case to determine the State's fair share.

Even where

the fee arrangement is based upon a fixed percentage, the Court
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will need to determine that percentage for each individual case.
As discussed previously, this information is important because
the recipient's percentage of attorney fees will act as a ceiling
on the amount of attorney fees the State must pay.

While the

State may often pay a smaller percentage than the recipient paid
his attorney, the State can never be required to pay a higher
percentage than the recipient paid his attorney.

Of course, even

if the Court adopted the approach that a "proportionate" (as
defined by Plaintiffs) fee must be paid in all cases, the Court
would still have to determine what percent each claimant paid to
his own counsel.19

This individual issue alone would predominate

over any common issue.
The fact finder will then need to examine the circumstances
of the case at the time the recipient requested consent and
determine the risks involved in pursuing the claim.

In making

this examination, the fact finder would look at the same
considerations the recipient's attorney considers when

19

Even if the Court used this approach, however, it would
still reject a presumption of 33% in every case. As mentioned
previously, the 33% contingent fee is not so prevalent that a
presumption of 33% should be given. Therefore, the Plaintiff
would have the burden to establish what percentage he had paid
his attorney.
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determining the percentage of attorney fees he will charge in a
contingency fee case.

The fact finder will then need to examine

how the pursuit of the recipient's claim progressed and how much
effort went in to procuring the State's recovery.

Based on these

examinations, the fact finder will then determine the reasonable
percentage of attorney fees the State owes the recipient within
the range of 20% to 33%.
In addition to this individual question, however, there are
numerous other individual questions that would be involved.20
Because of the myriad individual questions that will necessarily
take place as part of this examination, there is little question
that the individual questions involved in this fact-intensive
inquiry would predominate over the common question in this case.
The Plaintiffs make much of the fact that the individual
inquiries involved in this case are primarily inquiries that can

While the Court will not attempt to make an exhaustive
list of such individual inquiries, a few of the potential
individual questions that will be involved are: (1) when the
request for consent was made, (2) how much investigation has been
done on the case prior to the request, (3) the likelihood of
settlement without a trial, (4) whether liability or causation
was aggressively contested, (5) the complexity of the case, (6)
whether the case went to trial or settled prior to trial, (7) the
experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer performing the
services, and (8) the amount of the Medicaid lien.
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be categorized as "damage" inquiries.

However, the mere fact

that individual inquiries relate to damages does not mean that
the inquiries cannot be considered in determining whether common
See Bell

questions predominate.
Communications,

Inc.,

Atlantic

Corp.

v.

Rochelle

339 F.3d 294, 307 (5th Cir. 2003) ("'where

the plaintiffs' damage claims focus almost entirely on facts and
issues specific to individuals rather than the class as a whole,
the potential . . . that the class action may degenerate in
practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried, renders class
treatment inappropriate.'") (quoting 0'Sullivan
Home Loans,

319 F.3d 732, 744 (5th Cir. 2003)).

v.

Countrywide

This is

especially true where, as here, the liability and damage phases
are closely intertwined.
The better reasoned view is that the court should examine
the entire litigation, including the damages phase, in making the
determination of whether common questions predominate.
Windham

v. Am. Brands

Inc.,

See

565 F.2d 59, 71 (4th Cir. 1977) ("a

trial judge cannot, in determining the manageability of a
proposed class action, look exclusively to only one aspect of the
case . . . ; he can and must look at the case as a whole and . .
consider proof of damages as well as other issues in the
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case.").

This is not a case where the damages can be calculated

using a mathematical formula.

Rather this is a case where

calculating damages would involve numerous individual mini-trials
that would defeat the desired efficiency of having a class action
case.

See

Windham,

565 F.2d at 68 ("where the issue of damages

and impact does not lend itself to . . . a mechanical
calculation, but requires separate mini-trials of an overwhelming
large number of individual claims, courts have found that the
staggering problems of logistics thus created make the damage
aspect predominate and render the class action unmanageable as a
class action.'') (quotations omitted).
Although the Plaintiffs are correct that the Call

case is

not directly on point, its conclusion is applicable: "Judicial
economy would be little served because the amount of the claim
for each class member would still need to be determined on an
individual basis, regardless of class action status."
at 183-84.

727 P.2d

The only claim left in this case is for attorney fees

and the determination of those attorney fees are an individual
fact intensive inquiry that makes certifying a class of
Plaintiffs in the first group inappropriate.
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2.

Cases Where the State Paid Attorney Fees or
Discounted its Lien

As previously mentioned, the second group includes those
claims where the State granted consent to the Plaintiff and
accordingly paid some attorney fees or discounted its lien.

The

reasons for not certifying a class of Plaintiffs fitting the
first group also warrant not certifying a class of Plaintiffs
fitting the second group because, in both groups, the amount of
attorney fees owed by the State would need to be determined using
a fact intensive inquiry.

However, independent of those reasons,

there are two additional problems with certifying a class of
Plaintiffs fitting in the second group.
The first problem with certifying a class of Plaintiffs in
the second group is that in many cases, if not most, the
Plaintiff's attorney entered into a retainer agreement with the
State whereby the State and the recipient expressly agreed to the
amount of attorney fees the State would pay.

In entering into

these retainer agreements, § 26-19-7(3) and (4) gives the State
broad discretion to establish the amount of attorney fees.
Section 26-19-7(3) states that

NX

[t]he department's written

consent, if given, shall state under what terms the interests of
the department may be represented in an action commenced by the
47
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recipient."

Section 26-19-7(4) then places a limit on the State

expressly prohibiting the State from paying "more than 33% of its
total recovery for attorney's fees."

The statute does not

provide a lower limit on what the State can pay.
Therefore, by the statute's plain language, the State has
broad discretion to state the terms of its consent, including the
amount of attorney fees, as long as it does not pay more than
33%.

The presumption, then, is that where the State has granted

consent and stated the terms of the representation in good faith,
the recipient and his attorney are bound by that agreement if
they accept it.

Where a recipient and the State have already

agreed to the amount of attorney fees, it is not this Court's
place to change the terms of that agreement.21

21

The Plaintiffs spend a brief portion of its memoranda
contending that these retainer agreements are unethical and
unenforceable. However, this Court declines to address the
serious and substantive contention that the State's agreements
are unethical and unenforceable when the matter has been only
briefly and collaterally argued. Such an argument should be the
subject of a separate motion where the matter can be fully
briefed and considered. Moreover, such a motion could not be
heard unless the original parties to the retainer agreement were
included in the case. The Court cannot rule on whether an
agreement is unethical and unenforceable when the recipient's
attorney who entered into the agreement is not present in the
case. However, even if the needed parties were included in the
case and the Plaintiffs are correct that the retainer agreements
are unenforceable, then a court would still need to determine
48
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However, aside from any agreements that occurred between the
State and the recipient, there is a second and more serious
problem with certifying a class of Plaintiffs where the State
consented.

In every case where the State paid an attorney fee or

discounted its lien, there will be issues involving estoppel,
waiver, or accord.

By accepting the State's attorney fee or

discount, a question necessarily arises whether the recipient
waived or is estopped from asserting a right to additional
attorney fees.

This is true whether or not there was any type of

substantive negotiation between the State and the recipient's
attorney.
The problem with certifying a class of Plaintiffs where the
Plaintiffs accepted a discount or money from the State is that
estoppel, waiver, and accord are all fact intensive inquiries.
See

State

of

Utah

v.

Irizarry,

945 P.2d 676,678 (Utah 1997)

(noting the "variety of fact-intensive circumstances" under which
estoppel can apply); IHC Health

Servs.,

Inc.

v.

D & K Mgmt. ,

what attorney fees should be awarded. As a practical matter, the
cases that involved an unenforceable agreement would be treated
the same way as the cases where the State never granted consent.
The Court's conclusion that class status is unwarranted in cases
where the State denied consent would be equally applicable to
cases where the agreement was held to be unenforceable.
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Inc.,

2003 UT 5 1 7,73 P.3d 320 ("Waiver is an intensely fact

dependent question, requiring a trial court to determine whether
a party has intentionally relinquished a known right, benefit, or
advantage."); Neiderhauser

Builders

and Dev.

Corp.

v.

Campbell,

824 P.2d 1193, 1198 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (reversing trial court
because there was a question of fact regarding accord and
satisfaction).

Because of the fact intensive inquiries regarding

these legal doctrines that must necessarily occur in cases where
the State gave a discount or paid an amount of attorney fees to
the recipient, these cases are not appropriate for class action
status.
Moreover, unlike the Plaintiffs in the first group, the
Plaintiffs in the second group not only have individual questions
as to damages, but also additional questions as to liability.
Whether an individual Plaintiff has waived his right to attorney
fees by accepting fees or a discount from the State is a question
of liability, not of damages.

Class actions are clearly more

inappropriate when there are not only individual questions
regarding damages, but also individual questions regarding
liability.

Therefore, class status is even more inappropriate
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for Plaintiffs in the second group than it is for the Plaintiffs
in the first group.
As should be clear from the Court's discussion, the
individual questions involved in determining the reasonable
attorney fees the State owes would by themselves predominate over
any common questions.

Therefore, based on these individual

questions alone, the class should be decertified.

However, it

should also be noted that there are additional individual
questions that would potentially arise that further makes
continued class status inappropriate.
Two additional individual questions are the State's two
defenses discussed previously.

The State's first potential

defense that was discussed was where the State satisfied its lien
wholly through its own efforts and not those of the recipient's
efforts.

Determining whether the lien was procured through the

State's efforts or the recipient's efforts will be a fact
intensive inquiry that requires examining the State's specific
actions in each case where the defense is raised.

This defense

will not be a common question among the class members because
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there will clearly be cases where the State took little or no
efforts to recover its lien.22
The State's second potential defense that was discussed is
where the recipient's lack of cooperation prevented the State
from collecting its lien from the third party.

As with the

State's first defense, determining whether the recipient's lack
of cooperation prevented the State from recovering its lien will
also be a fact intensive inquiry.

Therefore, where the defense

is raised, it will constitute an individual question not common
among the class.23
Aside from the individual questions already discussed, it
should also be noted that the Plaintiffs' "futility" exception
would present another individual question that would make class

Admittedly, the Court does not know how much of an issue
this will be. It may well be that in the vast majority of cases,
the State's recovery was clearly through the efforts of the
recipient and therefore the State will not attempt to use this
defense. Because it is unknown in how many cases this defense
will be raised, the Court is not placing great weight on this
defense as an individual question.
23

As with the State's first defense, this defense may also
not be much of an issue and there may be very few cases where the
State contends that the recipient's failure to cooperate
prevented the State from recovering its own lien. For this
reason, the Court is placing very little weight on this defense
as well in determining whether common questions predominate.
52

) I *n

j \ ^

action status unwarranted.

As previously discussed, the

Plaintiffs contend that even where the recipient did not request
consent from the State, the Court should allow the recovery of
attorney fees where it would have been futile to ask the State
for consent due to purported State policy of denying consent for
certain categories of cases.

Although the Court has rejected

Plaintiffs' request to relax the request for consent requirement,
if a futility exception applied, it would present an individual
question based on whether the individual Plaintiff was aware of a
State policy that made a request for consent futile.

If the

Plaintiff was not aware that the request would be futile, then
the basis for recognizing the exception would not be present.
Therefore, were the Plaintiffs correct that there should be a
futility exception, the exception would provide another
individual question that would further support the Court's
reasons for decertifying the class.
As can be seen from the Court's above discussion, revising
and certifying a new class of Plaintiffs is unwarranted because
there is no potential class that would satisfy the requirements
of Rule 23.

The common question among the class members would

not predominate over the individual questions that exist.

Hence,
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rather than revise or certify a new class, the current class
should be decertified.

Therefore, for the above reasons, the

State's motion to decertify is hereby GRANTED.
The Court's decision to decertify the class potentially
impacts at least some of the various pending motions from the
parties.

In light of this potential impact, the Court directs

each party to simultaneously submit supplemental briefs by
January 12, 2007 addressing any impact of today's ruling on the
various outstanding motions.

Once the parties have filed the

supplemental briefs, this Court will schedule a hearing to hear
arguments on all remaining outstanding motions.

DATED this ^7-

day of December, 2006.
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ROBERT B. SYKES & ASSOCIATES
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
311 SOUTH STATE STREET, SUITE 240
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111-2320
TELEPHONE: (801)533-0222
FAX: (801) 533-8081
Practice Concentrates in Personal Injury Law
Emphasis on Brain and Spinal Cord Injury Cases
Civil Rights Litigation

ROBERT B. SYKES
ALYSON E. CARTER

Of Counsel:
ROBERT J. FULLER

January 9, 2007
~ Via Telefax & U.S. Mail -

Judge Anthony B. Quinn
Third Judicial District Court
450 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re: Houghton, et al v. State of Utah, Civil No. 950907491CV
Order of December 22, 2006
Dear Judge Quinn:
I am in receipt of your December 22, 2006, 54-page Order ruling on the
decertification motion. The last paragraph indicates the following:
In light of this potential impact, the Court directs each party to simultaneously submit
supplemental briefs by January 129 200 7 addressing any impact of today's ruling on
the various outstanding motions. Once the parties have filed the supplemental briefs,
this Court will schedule a hearing to hear arguments on all remaining outstanding
motions.
12/22/06 Order, p. 54 (emphasis added). I assume that the intent of that language is to allow you to
rule on other pending motions so that a future appeal will address all possible issues. If that is the
intent, I think that is a good thing. The only problem is that asking for Briefs by January 12th
contemplates hearing these matters at a future hearing, when the time for appealing the
decertification motion will have undoubtedly passed.
I would have to interpret an order granting decertification as a "final order," which
means that my time to appeal would end on January 21, 2007 (if I am counting the days correctly).
I doubt very much that we could brief and hear further matters on or before that date. Further, if I
file a Notice of Appeal there is a question in my mind as to whether or not it would divest you of any
jurisdiction to hear these other matters.
One solution to this problem may be to amend your 12/22/06 Order and make it clear
that this Order is not a final Order until such time as you have ruled on these other matters. Perhaps
also I could file a Notice of Appeal with a stipulation of counsel and agreement by the Court that the

LiPU

Judge Anthony B. Quinn
January 9, 2007
Page 2

Notice could later be amended to include the other matters. It is an unusual situation and I am not
quite sure exactly how to proceed, but I do need to protect the right to appeal, as you can well
imagine.
I would appreciate hearing from you shortly on this matter.

Verv

RBS:jac
cc: Phillip S. Lott, Esq. (via fax & mail)
Q:\CLIENT\1496Houghton\l. A\1.2 C\Quinn.010907.wpd
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PAUL HOUGHTON,
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MINUTE ENTRY

vs .

Case No: 950907491

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
Defendant.

Judge: ANTHONY B. QUINN
Date:
January 12, 2007

This Minute Entry will clarify that the Court's Order of December
22, 2006 is not intended as a final order. Additional Motions will
be heard on January 23, 2007 that may result in modification of the
Order. Until the Order is signed following the
January 23rd hearing, the December 22nd Order should be considered
provisional.
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
- Third lufjich! District
FEB 1 5 2307

PHILIP S. LOTT (5750)
STEVEN A. COMBE (5456)
Assistant Utah Attorneys General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856
Telephone: (801) 366-0100

SALI LAKt

Deputy Clerk"

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
PAUL HOUGHTON, et ai,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

1)
2)
3)

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, et ai,
Defendants.

4)

ORDER DENYING
PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS:
FOR ASSESSMENT OF INTEREST ON
DAMAGES,
FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES,
TO DETERMINE THAT PLAINTIFFS'
CLAIMS DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN
"INJURY" UNDER THE
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
AND ARE EQUITABLE IN NATURE,
AND
FOR SANCTIONS DUE TO
SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE.

Civil No.\J950907491
Judge Anthony B. Quinn
THIS MATTER having come before the Court for hearing on January 23, 2006, of Plaintiffs'
Motions: 1) For Assessment of Interest on Damages, 2) For Award of Attorney Fees, 3) To Determine
That Plaintiffs' Claims Do Not Constitute An "Injury" Under the Governmental Immunity Act, and
4) For Sanctions Due to Spoliation of Evidence; Plaintiffs appearing by and through their counsel,
Robert B. Sykes, and Defendants appearing by and through their counsel, Philip S. Lott; the Court
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having reviewed the pleadings, received oral arguments from counsel, and being otherwise fully
advised, FINDS:
Impact of December 22,2006 Order
1. The Court's December 22, 2006 Order on Motion for Decertification necessarily impacts
Plaintiffs'remaining motions as addressed herein.
2. Because the individually named Plaintiffs are free to proceed on their individual claims, the
December 22,2006 Order does not terminate the entire litigation.
Plaintiffs' Motion for Assessment of Interest on Damages
3. In the December 22, 2006 Order, the Court rejected Plaintiffs' contention that the State's
attorney fees are presumptively 33% and, instead, held that any attorney fees due will have to be
determined on an individual, case by case basis.
4. Because the amount of any attorney fees due will have to be determined on a case by case
basis and will not be a liquidated amount, Plaintiffs' cannot be awarded prejudgment interest and their
motion should be denied.
Plaintiffs9 Motion for Award of Attorney Fees
5. The individually named Plaintiffs' claims for attorney fees are mooted by the December 22,
2006 Order which prevents this lawsuit from proceeding as a class action.
6. The individually named Plaintiffs' claims are for personal, individual awards of money.
7. The cost of pursuing the individually named Plaintiffs' personal pecuniary interests does not
require subsidization by allowing a separate recovery for attorney fees incurred in prosecuting their
claims.
2
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8. The general rule in Utah, that attorney fees cannot be recovered by a prevailing party unless a
statute or contract authorizes such an award, should be followed in this case and the motion for attorney
fees should be denied.
Plaintiffs' Motions to Determine That Plaintiffs' Claims Do Not Constitute an "Injury"
under the Governmental Immunity Act and Are Equitable in Nature
9. These motions are directed at determining whether the applicable statute of limitations
extends beyond the limitations period allowed by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
10. Because there is no evidence that the claims of the individually named Plaintiffs arose
before the statute of limitations under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, these motions are moot
and should be denied.
Plaintiffs9 Motion for Sanctions Due to Spoliation of Evidence
11. Because at this time there is no evidence of spoliation of evidence that would affect the
claims of the individually named Plaintiffs, this motion should be denied without prejudice.
The December 22, 2006 Order on Motion for Decertification Is Now a Final Order
12. The Court's January 12, 2007 Minute Entry provided that the December 22, 2006 Order was
not intended to be a final order until after consideration of the additional motions addressed herein.
13. There will be no modifications to the December 22, 2006 Order on Motion for
Decertification.
14. With the signing of this Order, the December 22, 2006 Order is now a final order.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:
1. Plaintiffs' Motions: 1) For Assessment of Interest on Damages, 2) For Award of Attorney
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Fees, and 3) To Determine That Plaintiffs' Claims Do Not Constitute An "Injury" Under the
Governmental Immunity Act are denied.
2. Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions Due to Spoliation of Evidence is denied without prejudice.
3. The December 22, 2006 Order on Motion for Decertification is now a final order.
DATED this /S?

day of February, 2007.
BY THE O

District
Appfloved as to form:

Philip S. Lott
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed Order Denying
Plaintiffs' Motions: 1) For Assessment of Interest on Damages, 2) For Award of Attorney Fees,
3) To Determine That Plaintiffs' Claims Do Not Constitute An "Injury" Under the Governmental
Immunity Act, and 4) For Sanctions Due to Spoliation of Evidence was mailed, postage pre-paid,
this 26th day of January, 2007, to the following:
Robert B. Sykes
Alyson E. Carter
ROBERT B. SYKES & ASSOCIATES
311 South State Street, #240
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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May 30,

2007

ROBERT B. SYKES
ROBERT B. SYKES & ASSOCIATES
311 S STATE ST STE 240
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111-2320
Re: Houghton v. DOH
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By.

\

Deputy •>

Utah Supreme Court No. 20070197
District Court No. 950907491

Dear Mr. SYKES:
Enclosed is a copy of the order granting the interlocutory appeal
entered by the Utah Supreme Court on May 29, 2007, in the above
referenced case.
This order takes the place of a notice of appeal. A docketing
statement is not required. However, in accordance with Rule 11,
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure you must make
arrangements for any necessary transcripts or inform us that no
transcripts are required. If transcripts are requested, payment
arrangements must be made. See Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
11. This should be done timely. Once this process is complete,
the district court will be notified that the record index should
be prepared and sent to the Utah Supreme Court. The briefing
schedule will be set upon receipt of the record index on appeal.
If you have any questions, please contact me at 578-3900.
Sincerely,

£^£+^^
Celia Urcino
Deputy Clerk
Enc.
cc:
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE
DEBRA J. MOORE
PHILIP S. LOTT
PEGGY E STONE

^<fe

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
oo 0oo —
Paul Houghton, Billie Henderson,
individually and each as
representative of a class,
Damian Henderson, Wayne Rubens,
Ron Roes and Susan Roes, who are
other members of these classes,
similarly situated,

FILED
hpncs t ATF COURTS
t~,x\
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HAY 2 S 200?

Petitioners,
v.

Case No. 20070197-SC
950907491

Department of Health, The Office
of Recovery Services, The Department
of Human Services and The State
of Utah (the "State Defendants")
and Rod L. Betit, Director of the
Department of Health and Director
of Department of Human Services;
Emma Chacone, Executive Director
of the Office of Recovery Services;
John Does 1-50 and Jane Does 1-50
(the "individual defendants"),
Respondents.

ORDER
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for
Permission to Appeal an Interlocutory Order, filed on March 7,
2007. A response to the petition was filed on April 12, 2007.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED pursuant to rule 5 of the Rules of
Appellate Procedure, the petition for permission to appeal the
interlocutory order is provisionally granted. Review will be
limited to the following questions, which the parties are
requested to brief.
1. Whether this Court has jurisdiction, pursuant to rule 5
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, to review the December
22, 2006 "order on motion for decertification", in light of
the district court's subsequent minute entry, dated January

i\-^\°\

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on May 30, 2007, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail or
placed in Interdepartmental mailing to be delivered to:
ROBERT B SYKES
ROBERT B SYKES & ASSOCIATES
311 S STATE ST STE 240
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111-2320
DEBRA J. MOORE
PHILIP S. LOTT
PEGGY E STONE
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 6TH FLR
PO BOX 140856
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0856
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE
ATTN: JODI BAILEY / MARINA DAVIS
4 50 S STATE ST
PO BOX 1860
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860
Dated this May 30, 2007.

By

C^CX/^L

/C//^a^i£L

Deputy Clerk
Case No. 20070197
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE, 950907491
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